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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1. Agency and choice 
 
Much of economics is devoted to the study of choice and the consequences of choices; 
in fact, rational choice theory forms one of the building blocks of microeconomic 
theory. Choice can be understood in a variety of forms and analyzed from a variety of 
perspectives (individual, temporal, interactive, collective, aggregated, and so on). In 
studying choices, economists have formulated—sometimes implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly—different views about the concept of agency and its relationship to rational 
choice. Naturally, concepts such as agency and rationality are also systematically 
studied by other disciplines, most notably philosophy, psychology, and cognitive sci-
ence. These other disciplines have often highlighted different aspects of these opera-
tive concepts.  
Orthodox approaches to economics often portray agents as being fully rational, 
which means that, (i) people have well-defined preferences and make decisions so as 
to maximize those preferences, (ii) preferences accurately reflect a person’s infor-
mation about their options, and (iii) people have the ability to update their beliefs 
about their options in light of changing information. Economists may disagree about 
the specific requirements underpinning (i) – (iii), but most, if not all, will submit to 
these criteria as the defining characteristics of economic science. 
Of course, people are not fully rational. Decades of experimental research and 
interdisciplinary collaborations between economists, psychologists, and neuroscien-
tists have produced an unending list of anomalies which serve to challenge orthodox 
interpretations of economic theory. This research reveals that not only is rationality 
unreliably demonstrated in human choice and inference, but also that the vast majority 
of human behavior is driven by automatic rather than controlled, and emotional rather 
than reflective processes. That individuals are cognitively constrained and prone to 
systematic errors in thinking and reasoning is now well known as bounded rationality. 
Research in the behavioural decision sciences, and notably in behavioural economics 
and neuroeconomics, has been developing in sometimes quite close interaction with 
these interdisciplinary efforts.  
In this thesis, I offer a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of 
agency and choice as they are understood and employed in economics and behavioral 
decision research—this perspective is two-fold: on the one hand, philosophical anal-
ysis can clarify ambiguities in definitions and concepts that can and do arise within 
interdisciplinary research. This is of particular importance given how philosophical 
concepts such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in economic studies of 
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rational choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject contemporary research 
on questions about agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny.  
On the other hand, the questions and topics discussed in this thesis can be under-
stood as an exercise in philosophy of science: they deal explicitly with questions and 
topics that pertain to the theoretical and empirical practices of scientists. This includes 
traditional microeconomic disciplines, such as decision and game theory, as well as 
interdisciplinary collaborations in behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and exper-
imental psychology. 
 
2. Economics meets psychology and cognitive science 
 
In recognizing that ordinary humans are boundedly rational, economists and decision 
researchers who utilize rational choice theory are faced with a difficult choice: one 
can stick to the standard concepts and tools of orthodox economics and bracket-out 
decision anomalies which challenge orthodoxy; or one can confront the evidence 
head-on and modify economic concepts and tools accordingly. Of course, how one 
reacts to this dilemma will depend on what they interpret the target and underlying 
units of economic analysis to be. Not surprisingly, opinions have been and remain 
divided on the (increasing) role of psychology and cognitive science in economics. 
Consider the following passages: 
 
Because psychology systematically explores human judgment, behavior, and well-
being, it can teach us important facts about how humans differ from the way they 
are traditionally described by economists. (Rabin, 1998, p. 11) 
 
Because economics is the science of how resources are allocated by individuals and 
by collective institutions like firms and markets, the psychology of individual be-
havior should underlie and inform economics, much as physics informs chemistry; 
archaeology informs anthropology; or neuroscience informs cognitive psychology. 
(Camerer, 1999, p. 10575) 
 
It is implied by the first two passages that economics needs psychology, or that it has 
much to learn from it, because individual persons are centers of decision-making—
which is to say, that choices are the outcome of their subjective beliefs and conscious 
and unconscious desires. It can be inferred from these points that some economists 
take the concepts of utility and preference to be psychologically real, and they hold 
out hope that cognitive psychology or neuroscience can illuminate where and/or how 
these concepts are realized. Hence, even if persons are not ideally or systematically 
rational, perhaps some part of them—or their brains—is.  
Now consider the following: 
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Neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models because the latter make no 
assumptions or draw no conclusions about physiology of the brain. Conversely, 
brain science cannot revolutionize economics because it has no vehicle for address-
ing the concerns of the latter. Economics and psychology differ in the question they 
ask. Therefore, abstractions that are useful for one discipline will typically be not 
very useful for the other. (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2008, p. 4) 
 
That economic agents and people have different properties should strike no one as 
surprising. Whereas people are pre-theoretical entities found in the world, eco-
nomic agency is a theoretical construction elaborated as part of the development of 
a family of models. (Ross, 2012, p. 691) 
 
By contrast, the latter two passages imply that economics doesn’t need psychology 
because economic agents are not human. Concepts like utility and preference are the-
oretical constructions—they are a necessary part of the economist’s toolkit; but no 
poking around inside of the head of individuals will reveal what utility is or where 
preferences come from. Any entity can, in theory, be modeled as an economic agent 
and this means that individual person isn’t special. But this suggests that persons may 
not centers of decision-making because choice, as it is traditionally conceived by 
economists, is the outcome of both internal processes and external forces.  
The passages above reveal an interesting but crucial tension in contemporary eco-
nomics concerning agency and choice: given the bounded rationality of ordinary hu-
mans, and, given the tools and concepts of orthodox economics, researchers are faced 
with the joint dilemma of re-evaluating their conception of economic agency and with 
defining more suitable candidates for the ascription of utilities and/or preferences. As 
will become evident in this thesis, this tension pulls in different directions and gives 
rise to conflicting ideologies about the future of economics and decision research.  
 
3. Four questions about agency and choice 
 
The considerations above give rise to a number of philosophical and methodological 
questions for scientific disciplines in the employ of rational choice theory. The chap-
ters in this thesis are centered around four sets of questions: 
 
Chapter 2: What does it mean to describe choice evidence as “mental” or “behav-
ioral”? How useful are such labels for interpreting decision phenomena, and what 
are the implications of their use in contemporary economic research? 
 
Chapter 3: To what extent are persons like economic agents, and under what con-
ditions do persons approximate economic agency? What does social cognition have 
to do with economic agency?     
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Chapter 4: How has interdisciplinary research on internal conflict and self-control 
impacted the concept of economic agency? What are the conceptual and ontological 
challenges of integrating economic formalism with psychological insights?  
 
Chapter 5: What are the advantages and disadvantages of interpreting choice as the 
outcome of dual processes? How has the dualistic narrative shaped the discipline of 
behavioral economics?  
 
A well-informed analysis of these questions must inevitably address themes from the 
broader canon of analytic philosophy, including philosophy of science and philosophy 
of mind. Below I provide an overview of themes and debates which pertain to each 
set of questions above. This overview will provide context for some of the more phil-
osophically nuanced issues regarding the cognitive and conceptual foundations of 
agency and choice. 
 
3.1 On the curious role of mental states in economics 
 
Few debates in the history and philosophy of science are as unrelenting as those which 
concern the scientific status of mental states. It is said that economic theory formalizes 
microeconomic explanations by representing agents’ desires in terms of a utility func-
tion over various outcomes and their beliefs in terms of a subjective probability func-
tion over various states of the world (Reiss, 2013; Rosenberg, 2018). These together 
entail a preference ordering. For most rational choice theorists, the logic underlying 
economic explanations is similar to the logic underlying ordinary folk-psychological 
reasoning, viz. both rely on the ascription of mental states to explain choice-behavior. 
Rosenberg (2018) describes this as “folk psychology formalized”. Yet, it may surprise 
some to learn that the ontology of mental states is important to the study of economic 
methodology: not only is it relevant to the selection and interpretation of evidence, 
but, for some, the identity of economics as a scientific discipline depends entirely on 
whether it permits or denies non-choice data—this includes, among other things, men-
tal states (Davis, 2006; Bruni & Sugden, 2007; Hands, 2009, 2013; Hausman, 1998; 
Ross, 2014; Edwards, 2012). There are two main views that are helpful to introduce 
at this point. 
Behaviorism, broadly construed, is the position that humans are stimulus-re-
sponse machines, and that behavior can be described and explained without making 
reference to mental events or to internal psychological processes (Graham, 2017). Be-
haviorists tend to regard individual actions as patterned—or conditioned—responses 
to external forces. These patterned responses may evolve into ever more sophisticated 
dispositions as new experiences feed into a person’s behavioral repertoire. This is 
what allows individuals to learn from their environment. Yet, the history of 
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behaviorism as both a theoretical doctrine and a series of scientific programs in the 
history and philosophy of science is quite complex: its role in economics is tied up in 
its role in psychology. To paraphrase Graham (2017), behaviorism can be interpreted 
in (at least) three ways, i.e. methodologically, psychologically, and/or analytically (I 
will not review their differences here). 
Mentalism, by contrast, is the position that humans are more than stimulus-re-
sponse machines, and that in order to understand individuals’ decisions and choice-
behaviors, economists may need to investigate the goings-on of the mind and/or brain. 
But like behaviorism, there are different variants of mentalism. One approach, dubbed 
“mindful economics” (Camerer, 2008; Hausman, 2008) has gained traction as a catch-
all phrase for models that either include psychological information or make claims 
(i.e. predictions, explanations) about psychological phenomena in relation to eco-
nomic behavior. The conventional wisdom here is that because mental states serve to 
predict and rationalize agents’ behavior, mental states should be included in econo-
mists’ everyday ontology of scientific objects. Mindful economics is generally not 
restrictive about what counts as psychological information. However, there are those 
within the mentalist camp who wish to distinguish mental states from purely physio-
logical and neural states (Dietrich & List, 2013, 2016; Okasha, 2016). This move is 
based on the idea that folk-psychological concepts are a class of scientific objects all 
their own and this special status allows them to play a unique role in economic models. 
But what is folk-psychology, exactly? 
Folk psychology refers to a patchwork of linguistic practices and sense-making 
norms according to which people predict and interpret each other’s actions. For many 
philosophers, folk psychology is synonymous with commonsense, wherein everyday 
psychological idioms—belief, desire, and intention being the most cited examples—
are used to ascribe mental states (McGeer, 2007; Hutto & Ratcliffe, 2007; Hutto, 
2007—see Ratcliffe, 2006, for compelling counterarguments). The relevance of folk 
psychology for economic methodology rests in the functional role that mental-state 
terms play: beliefs and desires don’t just represent internal, psychological processes—
their function as a sense-making technology is tied-up in the behavioral patterns that 
these terms support and describe (Davidson, 1974; Dennett, 1971, 1978, 1989; Ross, 
2005; cf. Fodor, 1987). In this way, what permits rational choice theorists to formalize 
folk psychology is the belief that mental states explain by virtue of their commonsense 
functions (Elster, 1983; Pettit, 1991, 2000; Reiss, 2013; Rosenberg, 2018).1 
While there is indeed a major positive shift in attitude regarding the permissibility 
of mental states for explaining decision phenomena (this is likely due to the growing 
                                                          
1 There is, of course, no denying that folk-psychological practices are underwritten by various 
neurobiological processes. But, what differentiates folk psychology from cognitive psychology 
or neuroscience is the recognition that mental state ascriptions are linguistic practices, and that 
words like “belief” and “desire” refer not to brain states but to behaviors. 
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popularity of behavioral economics), there are interesting, if contentious, assumptions 
built into recent defenses of mentalism which seem to ignore decades of careful toiling 
over how mental state ascriptions relate to actual folk-psychological practices.2 This 
has implications for current debates in economics about whether decision theoretic 
concepts like utility, belief, and preferences should be interpreted as mental states or, 
by contrast, as dispositions to act and behave in certain ways.  
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the relevance of the mentalism-behaviorism (MB) di-
chotomy in economics in light of recent debates and subsequent arguments in favor 
of mentalism. The MB dichotomy in economics has historical ties to debates in the 
history and philosophy of science concerning the foundations of psychological expla-
nation. In this chapter, I argue that there are two problems with current conceptions 
of the MB dichotomy as it pertains to how economists and decision researchers inter-
pret and gather evidence. First, it is unclear what the MB dichotomy pertains to or is 
about exactly—which is to say, economists and decision researchers may have differ-
ent motivations for endorsing mentalism and/or for opposing behaviorism. Second, 
and more importantly, it is unclear how the MB dichotomy is supposed to improve or 
advance empirical research in economics and decision research—in particular, sup-
porters of mentalism have the difficult task of clarifying what mentalism entails or 
consists in (beyond vapid appeals to folk psychology). In response to the first problem, 
I consider two common motivations for endorsing mentalism: one motivation appeals 
to the choice-theoretic foundations of economics; the other appeals to scientific prac-
tice in economics. In response to the second problem, I argue that the MB dichotomy 
likely won’t advance or improve scientific practice in contemporary economic set-
tings because neither mentalism (nor behaviorism) are equipped to analyze and re-
solve explanatory problems that are unique to non-choice data, i.e. psychological and 
neuroscientific data. I conclude by discussing the limitations of functionalism, the 
mainstay of the mentalism defense book, and suggest alternative schemas to the MB 
                                                          
2 Some philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists are skeptical of the propositional attitude 
interpretation of folk psychology because it presumes an internalist (neocartesian) picture of 
the individual. In fact, there are a number of reasons why philosophers reject this view; but 
three will suffice to make the case. Firstly, the propositional attitude interpretation of folk psy-
chology presupposes that individuals have first-person epistemic authority (self-knowledge) 
about their mental states. But introspection is not always reliable as people are prone to confab-
ulation and other forms of error or self-deception about their beliefs, desires, etc. (McGeer, 
1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Secondly, Introspection, understood as the process of accessing 
self-knowledge, is not psychologically realistic if it excludes external sources of information—
namely, other people and norms of reinforcement. Thus, self-knowledge is constructed with the 
help of others through processes of enculturation. This means that the terms used to pick out 
mental states have a commissive and regulative element (McGeer, 2007, 2015; Hutto, 2007). 
Thirdly, propositional attitudes are crude semantic approximations of cognitive and affective 
states that aren’t well understood by cognitive neuroscience. It may be, and likely is, the case 
that there is nothing structurally analogous to beliefs or desires in the brain (Dennett, 1991; 
Hutto, 2007; Hutto & Myin, 2012).  
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dichotomy, some of which are employed in neighboring areas of the cognitive and 
behavioral sciences.  
 
3.2 Individualism versus anti-individualism: an ontological debate  
 
Many debates in the social and behavioral sciences revolve around the idea that col-
lective action can be explained in terms of individual behavior. Such views emphasize 
the importance of persons as intentional agents and assume that collective actions can 
be investigated by appealing to the internal psychological states of individuals. More-
over, such views hold that social phenomena—such as markets and business cycles, 
voting trends, surges in innovation, language conventions, and other artifacts of social 
interaction—can be decomposed into the actions of individuals despite their apparent 
complexity. This popular albeit controversial view is known as individualism and is 
often, though perhaps misleadingly, called methodological individualism (Hodgson, 
2007; Ross, 2005).  
 In principle, individualism supposes that if some social phenomenon is decom-
posable into the actions of individual persons, then knowledge of the causes of their 
behaviors—what could be called “micro-foundations”—should be sufficient to under-
stand how the social phenomenon occurs and produces further social phenomena. 
However, what constitutes a micro-foundation is a contingent matter rather than a 
principled one. For instance, individualism could be read as an ontological thesis, 
meaning that individual persons have a special, theoretical status among other objects 
in the world; what we then perceive as collective actions and events are merely epi-
phenomena, i.e. events that supervene on the actions of individuals. Or, individualism 
could be read as a metaphysical thesis, meaning that collective actions are bona fide 
phenomena, but that individual persons are causally necessary to produce such phe-
nomena. Or, individualism could be read as an explanatory thesis, meaning that col-
lective actions are descriptively redundant to the extent that knowledge of the me-
chanics of individual choice are more parsimonious or more informative than expla-
nations which reside at the social level.  
 That there is discrepancy over which is the correct interpretation of individualism 
raises a critical issue for proponents of it—namely, that it is uncertain what is the right 
criterion for decomposing and thereby understanding social phenomena. What serves 
the function of a micro-foundation in one context may be entirely inappropriate in 
another. This issue is further complicated by the fact that individualism is not a theory 
per se (similar to folk psychology), but a family of theses that loosely correspond to 
researchers’ concerns about socially-embedded individuals.  
 Yet, in market contexts (which is nearly all contexts), people are bounded—both 
rationally and individually (Ross, 2005; Davis, 2014); and the institutional and infor-
mational structures through which people are bounded are external to individuals. 
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Hence, it seems unlike that the same structural dynamics which produce social ac-
tion—those which simultaneously constrain and support how individuals choose and 
act with others—could be interpreted as or read off internal decision processes.  
 In Chapter 3 I argue that individualism is problematic as a basis for investigating 
social interaction. In so doing, I examine Don Ross’s (2005, 2006) account of “mul-
tiple-selves” as a way of reconciling individuals’ bounded rationality with their 
bounded individuality. Ross argues that individual persons are complex aggregations 
of selves, which arise in response to external pressures to regulate individual behav-
iors and enable the tracking of public norms and conventions. I thus investigate the 
different roles that selves play in Ross’s broader philosophy of economics and I iden-
tify separate projects that arise therein. To this end, I distinguish three different roles 
for selves, which are evolutionary, narrative, and economic, and I argue that these 
roles contribute to two distinct, but overlapping, projects. My aim is to show that there 
is a tension underlying these projects, but that it’s difficult to say where this tension 
arises because of how selves are multiply understood and used to defend these pro-
jects. I will argue that, while it is not problematic to conceive of selves according to 
their different roles, we should not presume that the functions or properties of selves 
in one role can serve the same purposes for different projects.  
 
3.3 Mixing metaphors: dual-selves or dual-processes  
 
Philosophers often speak of carving nature “at its joints”. Since Plato (see Phaedrus), 
this figure of speech has been used to describe the analytical exercise of partitioning 
the world into manageable parts and properties—what some philosophers call “natural 
kinds” (cf. Campbell, O’Rourke, and Slater, 2011).  The aim of such an exercise is 
not simply to determine which parts and properties of the world are fundamental, as 
this is a job for physicists; it is, rather, to understand which categories are instrumental 
and conducive to understanding the natural world. The reason philosophers speak of 
carving nature at its joints is because knowledge of fundamental parts and properties 
isn’t sufficient to provide understanding of more complex objects and processes. (If it 
were, then all of natural science would devolve into fundamental physics.) However, 
some phenomena, namely social phenomena like choice formation, do not lend them-
selves to easy carving, as it were, in which case researchers rely on metaphors to take 
some of the explanatory burden. Consider the feeling of being “of two minds” about 
a situation, or of feeling loath to accomplish a task. What does it mean to be of two 
minds about a decision? There are different ways of cashing out this idiom, and the 
analogy of carving nature at its joints is particularly instructive here: 
 Multiple-self models of intrapersonal and intertemporal choice emerged in deci-
sion theory and game theory to help economists better understand the dynamics of 
internal conflict and to predict—and hopefully explain—choice anomalies and 
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inconsistencies that arise over time. This modeling technique is achieved by depicting 
the individual decision-maker as a coalition of temporally distinct “selves” who must 
cooperate (or compete) to satisfy their respective ends. Although early intertemporal 
choice models were not intended to identify the psychological determinants of choice 
(each temporal self was taken to be an independent utility-maximizing agent, cf. Sam-
uelson, 1937) subsequent time-preference models by Strotz (1956) and Phelps & Pol-
lak (1968) proposed to partition individuals into selves (or generations) with distinc-
tive motives. It was thus demonstrated that myopic and weak-willed behaviors could 
be the result of a tradeoff between short and long-term interests. Thaler & Shefrin 
(1981; cf. Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) were among the first to conceive of this multiple-
self approach in an explicitly dualistic framework between a long-run “planner” self 
and short-run “doer” self.  
 On the other hand, the concept of bounded rationality invoked by many behav-
ioral economists and decision researchers relies on the notion of information pro-
cessing. Clearly humans are not “von Neumann computers”; yet, the idea that the 
brain can be interpreted as a computer has roots in the cognitive revolution of the 
1960's and 1970s wherein the majority of human mental activities began to be inter-
preted as information processing (Baars, 1996; Garner, 1987; Daugman, 2001; 
Mirowski, 2002). Despite philosophical debates about the nature of computational 
theories of cognition,3 the computer metaphor has been widely and repeatedly rein-
forced in the behavioral sciences under the assumption that humans—or rather, their 
brains—actually perform computations when reasoning and problem-solving. Part of 
what has made this brain-as-a-computer metaphor gain so much traction is that it 
builds upon a secondary, though perhaps more confusing notion in the cognitive and 
behavioral science—that notion of cognitive processing. Hence, dual-process theories 
of reasoning and judgment are another means of capturing internal conflict. While 
there are dual-process theories for nearly every aspect of cognition, the primary as-
sumption behind dual-process theories is that both conscious and unconscious think-
ing depends on the interplay of separate cognitive modes: one mode is said to involve 
processes that are fast, reactive, and automatic, while the other mode is said to involve 
processes that are slow, controlled, and deliberative (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Ep-
stein, 1994; Stanovich & West, 2000; Lieberman, 2003). This distinction allows re-
searchers to discern “higher” cognitive processing, which are associated with deliber-
ative judgments and the ability to reason logically, from “lower”, more primitive in-
formation processing, which is usually associated with affective states and visceral 
responses.   
                                                          
3 See van Gelder (1995), Hutto et al (2018); cf. Piccinini (2013), Piccinini & Bahar (2015).   
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 Over the last two decades, interesting collaborations between economists and 
psychologists have given rise to integrative models which weave together the meta-
phor of the multiple-self with the metaphor of the dual-information processor.  
 In Chapter 4, I critically examine how multiple-self models of intrapersonal and 
intertemporal choice have been integrated with dual-process and dual-system theories 
from social psychology and cognitive science. I adopt the term “multi-agent model” 
to denote models which conceive of multiple agents with multiple psychological abil-
ities within the individual. Such models seem to be growing in popularity given their 
purported ability to predict and explain reasoning errors and decision anomalies due 
to internal conflict or lack of self-control. In particular, I analyze how multi-agent 
models conceive of and employ “selves” and “systems” for the purposes of represent-
ing intrapersonal and intraneural conflict. The chapter is structured according to three 
claims. The first and second claims establish that multi-agent models are conceptually 
as well as ontologically ambiguous. The third claim argues that such ambiguities can 
lead to problems in scientific understanding. The examination of multi-agent models 
is not only critical to understanding how economists and psychologists jointly inter-
pret and model self-control problems, but it further presents an important opportunity 
to study the effects of cross-disciplinary pollination of concepts and theories.  
 
3.4 Why is two the magic number? Further challenges for dual process theories  
 
The explanatory heuristic of parsing individuals into manageable parts has historically 
taken two to be the magic number, often using a dualistic framework to contrast com-
peting aspects of the human will. As described by Evans & Frankish (2009), the leg-
acy of framing human thought as dualistic has roots in Plato, Augustine, Freud, James, 
and so forth; and as I suggested above, both cognitive and behavioral scientists have 
latched on (hard) to this framework. Behavioral economists’ preference for partition-
ing human activity (critical thinking, decision-making) into dual process and dual sys-
tems seems to be more than merely a passing fad.  
However, the faith in dual process theory indicates more than an interest in im-
proved modeling. In fact, it was recently argued that behavioral economics, construed 
as an independent field of research, is closer in kind to cognitive science than it is to 
orthodox economics. Angner & Loewenstein (2012) observe a number of links be-
tween behavioral economics and cognitive science, which they attribute to the success 
of behavioral economics as an independent discipline. These links range from shared 
theoretical commitments, e.g., both disavow positivist methodological doctrines in the 
behavioral sciences, to historical affiliations, e.g., behavioral economics emerged 
from the field of behavioral decision research. The claim that behavioral economics 
has a kinship with cognitive science represents a bold new step in a series of reflec-
tions on the relationship between economics and psychology. However, Angner & 
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Loewenstein’s appraisal of the links between behavioral economics and the cognitive 
sciences is uncritical in ways that reinforce the problems above. It takes for granted 
(and even seems to celebrate) the freedom with which behavioral economists have 
explored the bounds of human rationality. It doesn’t consider whether the insights and 
resources accumulated from the cognitive sciences are credible or well-founded, 
which is to say, it does not actively engage with debates in psychology or cognitive 
science. This is representative of a broader trend in the literature on economics and 
psychology, in which greater emphasis is placed on the history of interdisciplinary 
exchanges than on issues which may be pertinent to the philosophy of science (see 
Lewin, 1996; Rabin, 1998; Sent, 2004; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2011; and 
Heukelom, 2014).4  
In fact, it could be argued that this lack of emphasis on the philosophy of science 
has something to do with how behavioral economics is generally conceived. Angner 
& Loewenstein write that, “These days, as it is typically employed ‘behavioral eco-
nomics’ refers to the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of eco-
nomic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations” where 
psychological plausibility means “consistent with the best available psychology” 
(2012, p. 642). 
In Chapter 5, I confront the success story of behavioral economics by investi-
gating the broader role that dual process theory has played as a psychological frame-
work: Cognitive scientists and philosophical psychologists alike have criticized the 
theoretical foundations of the standard view of dual process theory and have argued 
against the validity and relevance of evidence used to support it. Moreover, recent 
modifications of dual process theory in light of these criticisms have generated addi-
tional concerns regarding its applicability and irrefutability. I argue that this should 
raise concerns for behavioral economists who see dual process theory as providing 
psychologically realistic foundations for their models. In particular, it raises the pos-
sibility that dualistic models are not as descriptively accurate or reliable as behavioral 
economists presume them to be. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of 
dual process theory in behavioral economics has less to do with the empirical success 
of dualistic models, and more to do with the convenience that the dualism narrative 
provides economists looking to sort out decision anomalies. I will argue that the grow-
ing number of criticisms against DPT leaves behavioral economists with something 
of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic 
                                                          
4 Investigations into the interdisciplinary exchanges between economics and psychology tend 
to focus on the historical episodes that led the disciplines to come together, with the emphasis 
on how economics has changed as a result of importing psychological concepts and theory. 
Such investigations tend to presume the credibility or factivity of psychological concepts and 
theories rather than engage them directly. 
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description of human decision-making and modify their use of DPT, or they stick to 
DPT and modify their ambitions.  
 
4. Outlook 
To conclude, two notes are in order. First, the chapters of this thesis are conceived of 
as independent research articles and are intended to be read that way. For this reason, 
there is no signaling to former or latter chapters—each is a stand-alone essay. But this 
also means there is occasional repetition in the listing of references and explication of 
concepts. But this is minimal. Second, in most instances, the term “economics” de-
notes microeconomics or some area of microeconomics, e.g., decision theory, game 
theory, behavioral economics, and so on. 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a philosophical analysis at two levels: one is 
to understand and analyze the operative concepts agency and choice, and to track their 
various forms and distillations across economics and behavioral decision research. 
Two is to understand how theories and models germane to these operative concepts 
travel between scientific disciplines, and to assess how this promotes and limits inter-
disciplinary collaboration. 
In Chapter 6 I offer concluding remarks and consider where one goes from here. 
First, Chapters 2 – 5 project two main approaches to reconciling the tension between 
agency and choice. One approach views individual persons as the primary objects of 
study for economics, and as such, psychology and neuroscience can help locate a more 
appropriate locus for the study of choice. The second approach views individual per-
sons not as the primary object of study, (economic agents are the primary study, and 
they are ontologically distinct from persons). As such, choice should be construed as 
the outcome of external (market) pressures, which include important socio-cognitive 
supports. Hence, for each of these approaches, there are new pursuits and new philo-
sophical questions to be considered.  
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Chapter 3 
The quasi-economic agency of human selves1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With all the recent advances in behavioral economics (including advances in experi-
mental psychology and neuroeconomics) perspectives about economic agency have 
shifted away from the traditional, neoclassical conception of the rational agent. It is 
now recognized that humans are boundedly rational, which means that persons typi-
cally do not think and behave like homo economicus agents. Among the methodolo-
gies for modeling boundedly rational individuals, multiple-self models have gained 
considerable popularity as tools for representing the dynamics of intrapersonal choice 
under various conditions and constraints. Multiple-self models typically work by iso-
lating features endogenous to individuals that motivate them to act in different ways. 
Generally, these features are taken to correspond to autonomous structures within the 
individual and, as such, are modeled as if they were independent agents (that is, inde-
pendent agents who can reason together). Some multiple-self models conceive of 
selves as temporal agents (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & 
Rabin, 1999, 2001), whereas other models conceive of selves as cognitive processes 
in, or mapped onto, the brain (Benhabib & Bisin, 2004; Jamison & Wegner, 2009; cf. 
Brocas & Carrillo, 2008, 2012). Yet, there is another sense in which individuals are 
thought to contain selves which is not well-represented in the economics literature:  
According to Don Ross (2005, 2006, 2010) individual persons are complex ag-
gregations of selves. These selves arise in response to external pressures to regulate 
individual behaviors, and they enable the tracking of public norms and conventions. 
In contrast with the many approaches to multiple-self modeling in behavioral decision 
research that focus explicitly on the cognitive-psychological basis of intrapersonal 
conflict, Ross argues that selves are not reducible to brain functions since they are 
conjunctions of neural and social activity, spanning the brain, body, and environment. 
In this way, selves are not the type of object that can be studied in isolation of the 
systems of which they are part. Rather, they are the virtual embodiment of individual 
and cultural narratives that are cultivated over the course of a person’s biography. It 
is because individuals have selves that they can engage in and maintain interpersonal 
relationships in the first place. It is thus believed that enculturated selves enable 
                                                          
1 For the publication, see Grayot, J. (2017). The Quasi-Economic Agency of Human Selves. 
Œconomia. History, Methodology, Philosophy, (7-4), 481-511. It can be found at: https://jour-
nals.openedition.org/oeconomia/2790 
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persons to navigate complex social networks free of the computational burden of con-
tinuously problem-solving coordination dilemmas.  
Ross’s conception of enculturated selves marks an important contribution to the 
study of economic agency for it challenges the idea that individuals are, or should be 
regarded as, centers of decision-making. His anti-individualistic perspective, which 
he has described as “non-anthropocentric” neoclassicism, presents a view of the indi-
vidual person that is bound by social and institutional constraints (2005). In this re-
gard, his understanding of multiple selves touches upon familiar projects of bounded 
individuality and the economics of identity which have also been discussed at length 
by Davis (2003, 2011). Yet, Ross’s account of selves is interesting because it forges 
novel links with the cognitive and behavioral sciences in ways that other accounts 
have not. It proposes that selves played (and continue to play) a critical role in the 
evolution of human social intelligence, namely through the sending and receiving of 
linguistic signals. Thus, for Ross, the economic function of selves as a behavior sta-
bilization technology is tied up in their ability to recognize and respond to linguistic 
and other signaling conventions. This makes for a much richer, albeit more convo-
luted, account of selves than others discussed in the economics literature.  
In this paper, I investigate the roles that selves play within Ross’s anti-individu-
alistic framework, and I identify separate projects that may be (and in some instances, 
have been) attributed to him based on different interpretations of what selves are be-
lieved to be. To this end, I distinguish three different roles for selves—these are evo-
lutionary, narrative, and economic—and I argue that these roles contribute to two 
distinct, but overlapping, projects in Ross’s broader philosophy of economics.2 One 
project is to give an account of the emergence of human socio-cognitive abilities, and 
to show how those abilities are necessary for market behavior. Another project is to 
give an account of economic agency that is both amenable to neoclassical economic 
methodology while remaining sensitive to the fact that humans are not ideal economic 
agents.  With these three roles and two projects in mind, my aim is to show that there 
is tension underlying these projects, but that it’s not clear where these tensions arise 
precisely because of how selves are multiply understood and used to defend these 
projects. I will argue that, while it is entirely possible to conceive of selves in accord-
ance with any of the roles that I have attributed to Ross—primarily because each role 
conceives selves as black boxes—we should not presume that the black-box function 
of selves serves the same purposes for both of his projects.  
                                                          
2 These roles will occasionally be equated with explanatory synonyms given how Ross has 
utilized them in his broader framework. Although I stick to the categories “evolutionary”, “nar-
rative”, and “economics”, sometimes these labels will coincide with alternative labels. For in-
stance, the evolutionary role is sometimes described as “biological”; the narrative role is some-
times described as “biographical”, and the economic role is sometimes described as “mathe-
matical”.  
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The bulk of my investigation analyzes arguments that are developed in his Eco-
nomic Theory and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation (Ross, 2005), and subsequent 
articles (Ross, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) where additional support is provided for the evo-
lutionary and economic basis of selves. In short, the aim of this investigation is not 
only to clarify what economists can (and can’t) expect to do with an account of selves 
like Ross’s, but it further indicates what promising work lies ahead for multiple-self 
models that are not strictly based on psychological or brain activity. 
This paper has the following structure. In Section 1, I provide the background and 
context for Ross’s conception of selves within his anti-individualist framework. Here 
I flesh out three main roles for selves. In Section 2, I make the case that there are, in 
fact, separate projects going on here, and I show that not all the resources from one 
project may be outsourced to another project without violating some of Ross’s core 
convictions. In Section 3, I recommend a few ways to reconcile these different pro-
jects, and discuss the ways that an anti-individualistic framework can interface with 
disciplines outside economics—here I contrast my view against others who have com-
mented on Ross’s work. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Non-anthropocentric neoclassicism and multiple-selves 
 
Ross’ describes his philosophy of economics as both “non-anthropocentric” (2005, 
pp. 19-22) and “neo-Samuelsonian” (see also Ross, 2014).3 His project envisions a 
return to the Samuelsonian tradition in economics where individual psychology is 
bracketed and excised from the study of markets and their effects on individual be-
haviors. As a preliminary discussion, this characterization of his project is succinct—
it is meant only to provide the groundwork for an investigation of his conception of 
selves. This will help us to understand why his project does not permit a single inter-
pretation for selves. 
 
2.1 Economic agency in an anti-individualistic economics 
 
Ross’ non-anthropocentric neoclassicism is predicated on the rejection of two princi-
ples commonly associated with microeconomic methodology: these are called “social 
atomism” and “microeconomic individualism” (2005, pp. 221-223). Social atomism 
is the thesis that persons are ontologically basic, which means that social phenomena 
can be understood in terms of the actions of individual persons, and that social reality 
is irreducible beyond persons (hence they are social ‘atoms’). Microeconomic indi-
vidualism builds upon social atomism by presuming that utility functions are intrinsic 
properties of persons. This more or less captures the “Robinson Crusoe” picture of 
                                                          
3 Ross refers to his position as “Samuelsonian” in (2005) but adopted the term “neo-Samuel-
sonian” in (2014) in light of commentary made by Hands (2008). 
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economic agency, by which persons are assumed to enter the world with pre-given 
utility functions for goods prior to encountering a socialized market. “Normative in-
dividualism”, by contrast, makes no claims about social ontology or the sources of 
individual utility; it is individualistic only insofar as it views persons as morally au-
tonomous agents, whose intrinsic worth should be taken into consideration for matters 
of policy or justice (Ross, 2005, pp. 220-222). The problem, Ross tells us, is that 
economists have tended to conflate microeconomic individualism (which logically 
implies atomism) with normative individualism: this gives rise to puzzling questions 
about the essential properties of economic agents. Who or what is an economic agent? 
—persons are thought to be agents, but what about firms? countries? Also, what cog-
nitive properties do economic agents have? —neoclassical economic models assume 
they have perfect information and powerful computational abilities, but this is obvi-
ously not true of persons in real life. By adopting a descriptive (as opposed to norma-
tive) anti-individualistic approach to economics, Ross argues that any intentional sys-
tem, human or non-human, can be modeled as an economic agent, and thus denies 
that there is anything uniquely human about economic agents. 
 Non-anthropocentric neoclassicism thus draws a sharp distinction between indi-
viduals and economic agents. This has two important corollaries in Ross’s anti-indi-
vidualistic philosophy of economics. First, he argues that preferences should not be 
interpreted as real computations that take place inside the minds (or brains) of persons 
(2005, p. 108). Utility functions—which are ad hoc valuations that numerically 
represent choices and preferences—are not properties of persons; they are the proper-
ties of economic agents which persons may approximate via the regulation of their 
behavior under specific conditions (cf. Pettit, 1995). While this first corollary follows 
naturally from Ross’s rejection of microeconomic individualism, decades of evidence 
from experimental and behavioral economic research into intrapersonal choice have 
also demonstrated that persons are not ideal economic agents given their tendencies 
to change and/or reverse preferences over time. For this reason, he states that, “…if 
agents are identified with utility functions, then the biography of a typical person can’t 
be the biography of a single (diachronic) economic agent” (Ross, 2005, p. 156). 
 If utility functions are just properties (i.e. numerical representations) of economic 
agents, and if any well-behaved intentional system can be ascribed a utility function, 
then preferences should be understood as points of reference for the behavioral output 
of whatever sociological and institutional pressures constrain the behavior of complex 
systems. For this reason, Ross reminds us that: 
 
…neoclassical theory, properly understood, is not directly about any specific kind 
of behavior, and rests on no ontological commitments more definite than the idea 
that agents can be analytically distinguished from one another (2005, p. 197). 
 
22 
 
 
Agents need not be internally simple—as people are not—so they can, in principle, 
be firms or households or whole countries or any other sort of unit that acts teleo-
logically…. (2005, p. 198)  
 
Without going into further depth about the general concept of agency, we can surmise 
that the economic agent, understood as a purely theoretical object, has neither onto-
logical nor psychological properties built into it, and so, warrants the extrication of 
human properties from it. This allows Ross to reaffirm the neo-Samuelsonian inter-
pretation of preferences as exogenously given: preferences should reflect the aggre-
gative influence of social norms and institutional pressures upon individuals, not their 
inner cognitive architectures. This anticipates the second corollary of Ross anti-indi-
vidualism. 
 The second corollary concerns economics as a science separate from psychology. 
In justifying the separateness of the disciplines, he argues (citing Lionel Robbins) that 
economics ought to be viewed as the “abstract logic of choice”, not as the study of 
causal mechanisms of individual choice. He states that, “the implication of the sepa-
rateness thesis as Robbins justifies it is that choice, as a psychological process, is a 
black box that, so far as economics is concerned, is supposed to be deliberately left 
shut” (Ross, 2005, p. 91). Yet, a further justification for the separateness thesis could 
be linked to Ross’s skepticism about the etiology of individual choice behavior as 
determined by mental content. In adopting Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance func-
tionalism (Dennett, 1987), Ross eschews the traditional internalist conception of in-
dividual choice, which supposes that propositional attitudes have causal power to in-
duce action. Ross, following Dennett, emphasizes that economics is about behavioral 
regularities, and that we can better study these regularities once we learn how lan-
guage networks structure and constrain social dynamics (Ross 2005, pp. 61-70).  
 According to this interpretation of economics as separate science, preferences 
should be distinguished from the study of the internal mechanics of decision-making 
as understood by the neuroscientist or behavioral economist.4 Thus, anti-individual-
ism does not deny that the interaction of real persons gives rise to complex social 
phenomena, but it emphatically denies that facts about how individual persons make 
decisions—information about their cognitive architectures and the wiring of their 
brains—are sufficient to explain the outcomes of their social interactions.5 
                                                          
4 While Ross argues that the mechanics of individual choice are idiosyncratic and not general-
izable, his claim that the groundwork for a theory of the economic agent should include a com-
mitment to some form of externalism is separately informed by his philosophical commitments.  
 
5 In bringing together these separate motivations and in justifying the divorce between econom-
ics and psychology, Ross sharply claims that he does not a priori deny that there is such a thing 
as faculty introspection, but he denies that it is a stable and direct source of evidence (2005, p. 
228). This take on introspection also clarifies his position with regard to the economic 
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 This characterization of Ross’s anti-individualistic philosophy of economics is 
important because it demonstrates why a concept of economic agency that strives to 
mirror human persons is potentially misleading—viz., because the economic agent, 
understood as a purely theoretical object, has neither ontological nor psychological 
properties built into it. None of the tenets of neoclassicism, according to Ross, require 
that rational agency apply directly to human persons. Likewise, processes and mech-
anisms that occur ‘below’ the level of the individual may also be modeled as economic 
agents, provided that such processes are the sort of unit that act teleologically. Below, 
I show how we get from descriptive anti-individualism to an account of selves. 
  
2.2 Three interpretations of selves 
 
By sharply distinguishing economic agents from flesh-and-blood individuals, Ross is 
forced to explain how it is that individual persons maintain stable behavior. He argues 
that individual persons are complex aggregations of behavioral profiles that are deter-
mined by social interactions. In contrast with most cognitive-psychological ap-
proaches to multiple-self modeling in behavioral economics, Ross argues that selves 
are not reducible to neural processes or modules in the brain, and so are not the type 
of object that can be studied in isolation of the social systems of which they are a part. 
This idea is influenced largely by Dennett’s conception of a “real pattern” (1991a)—
i.e. mental and social constructions generated by our beliefs about ourselves, beliefs 
that are regulated by sense-making norms, and the actions those beliefs produce in 
others via public language (Ross, 2005, p. 18). In this way selves are the product of 
interpersonal experiences that are imbued with meaning through everyday practices 
and ideals recognized by a society. In this way, selves are the manifestation of both 
individual and cultural norms that are cultivated over the course of a person’s biog-
raphy, what many philosophers have referred to as “narratives”. However, it would 
be misleading to say that selves are just features of a person’s personality or identity 
that inform a narrative. This would miss out on several important functions that selves 
play. Below I describe how Ross conceives of selves as narrative constructions; I then 
compare this role with their evolutionary and economic roles.   
 
Selves as narrative constructions 
 
The term “multiple-self” is a convention familiar to both economists and philoso-
phers. For many philosophers, the term indicates that persons contain multitudes, and 
that each human biography is rich with personal memories, beliefs and desires, con-
victions, aspirations, and expectations for the future. All these facets contribute to a 
                                                          
methodology of Robbins and Samuelson, i.e. why he thinks that Robbins’s inclusion of intro-
spection is integral to understanding economics as a deductive science.   
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common theme in philosophy which is that the self is a ‘story’, or rather, that selves 
are ‘stories’ which make up a person’s identity. How Ross understands the narrative 
interpretation of selves is consistent with this theme; however, his contribution relies 
heavily on exploring how the confluence of personal experiences that make up each 
biography are intertwined with other biographies. This idea of co-authoring of per-
sonal stories is borrowed from Dennett (1991a).  
The idea that selves embody real behavioral patterns stems from the assumption 
that humans are social animals and that our social embeddedness in groups leads to 
the construction of distinctive narratives that operate much like programs or plug-ins: 
they represent strategies to act in normatively acceptable ways by guiding behaviors 
according to the demands of a context or a convention. On this interpretation, selves 
emerge from a continuous process of enculturation. Ross describes it as follows:  
 
Selves… facilitate increasing predictive leverage over time by acquiring richer 
structure as the narratives that produce them identify their dispositions in wider 
ranges of situations. On this account, individuals are not born with selves; further-
more, to the extent that the consistency constraints on self-narratives come from 
social pressures, particular narrative trajectories are not endogenous to individuals. 
(2006, p. 203) 
 
That persons are not born with selves speaks to the importance of enculturation in 
shaping a human biography. A human biography involves many dialogical modes of 
being, each of which corresponds to a number of narrative constraints; these narratives 
contribute to the experience of self that one identifies with. Of course, this experience 
is contingent upon how one manages and leverages their own narrative (an ideal of 
how they envision themselves) against the narratives that society imposes against 
them. 
The fluidity and success of my interactions with others thus depends on the mu-
tual, though often implicit, assumption that I will meet others’ expectations as dictated 
by our construal of these shared narratives. Thus, I am the culmination of personal 
histories with family, friends, and colleagues, and of institutional and public codes of 
conduct, and I choose—as far as I can choose—how to maintain these personal histo-
ries. As Ross opines, “This philosophical account nicely captures the phenomenology 
and microstructure of selfhood. A personality is experienced to itself, and to others, 
as a relatively coherent story” (2005, p. 203). This illustrates how selves are narra-
tively constructed and how their biographies are sculpted by everyday social interac-
tions. However, we should keep in mind that this idea of a narrative is an instructive 
tool that enables academics to make sense of how individuals track their own stories—
it’s not as if people consciously construct narratives or think of themselves as charac-
ters whose actions must be coherent, otherwise they’ll violate literary conventions of 
stability. What we should expect from a narrative approach to selves is a handle for 
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describing the constraints that are imposed on a human biography. In section 3 I ex-
plore how these constraints are realized, both formally and informally. 
 
Selves as evolved mechanisms for social intelligence 
 
Perhaps more important than the narrative construction of selves is the evolutionary 
role they play for Ross. In order to show that selves are behavioral stabilization de-
vices, Ross argues, it must first be shown that humans, as social animals, were under 
selective pressure to be good at coordinating and that the biological basis of selves 
was to facilitate collective endeavors that promoted safety and survival of humans. 
Ross tells us that the fundamental kinds of games that social animals need to solve, 
“indeed, the class whose solution is almost constitutive of sociality” are coordination 
games (2005, p. 273). However, a little more needs to be said about the cognitive 
demands of “sociality”, and about what conditions would need to be met in order for 
selves to emerge in the first place. 
Distributed language and the cultural and institutional artifacts it generates are 
usually taken to be the distinctive marks of human intelligence (Ross, 2007b; see also 
Zawidzki, 2013). Yet, prior to the enculturation of H. sapiens, it was our perceptual 
acuity and the capacity to problem solve within ecologically constructed niches that 
set us apart from other hominids. Our predatory design enables us to process infor-
mation of magnitudes that are staggering, and contemporary neuroscience reveals that 
much of what we intake is not consciously registered but is filtered for errors—for 
perceptual outliers that violate a predictive encoding of our immediate environment. 
This is the perceptual basis of what Andy Clark has called “biological reason” (1997, 
see also Clark, 1998, 2001) and it sets the evolutionary stage for improvements in 
cognition that extend beyond the brain and body. Biological reason can thus be seen 
as Mother Nature’s response to information bottlenecks in the cognitive architecture 
of individual organisms that needed to communicate to solve joint ventures. Here, 
bottleneck refers to a physical limitation in computing power that occurs when the 
quantity of information a system receives exceeds the resources available for ‘pro-
cessing’ it. The scare-quotes here are meant to indicate that cognitive processing for 
humans is not a straightforwardly physical matter as it is for von Neumann computer 
architectures.6  
But increased social intelligence precipitates further challenges. New social ar-
rangements enabled by signaling devices and proto-languages would encourage new 
possibilities to act, and this would have made it difficult to predict the behaviors of 
conspecifics without some reinforcing norms in place. This introduces a genuine 
                                                          
6 For more on biological reason and situated agency, see Clark (1998, 2001, 2012); for more on 
hierarchical predictive encoding and its role in action-oriented perception, see Clark (2015) 
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possibility that information bottlenecks would inhibit collective action based on the 
sheer number of factors that would need to be considered before making an informed 
judgement. As such, the capacity for sociality would have generated its own need for 
adaptive engineering to enable humans to coordinate effectively. This conundrum is 
well-captured when Ross says that, “increases in nonparametric environmental com-
plexity that arise with sociality put pressure on the power of straightforward economic 
agency” (2005, p. 277). If natural selection did favor socially intelligent individuals 
for the sake of computational efficiency it must have been because signaling systems 
provided an external apparatus to distribute the cognitive burden that social interac-
tion would otherwise impose on individuals forced to compute solutions to coordina-
tion dilemmas on their own.  
The problem that selves emerged to solve was not just the distribution of cogni-
tion via signaling systems, but the maintenance and preservation of strategies to pro-
tect individuals from exploitation once information became publicly available. Pre-
sumably, this is because as coordination drifted away from “purity”—i.e. away from 
situations of mutual advantage to situations with asymmetric benefits—signaling 
complexity would have given some individuals advantage over others. This drift and 
subsequent advancement in signaling phenomena forecasts what’s known as the 
Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that social intelli-
gence emerged as a result of competing pressures to find coordination solutions with 
partners without ceding strategic advantage to those partners (cf. Byrne and Whiten, 
1988, 1997). The importance of the hypothesis for the current discussion is that it 
establishes the environmental conditions that would have prompted the emergence of 
selves for stabilizing unpredictable behaviors while also protecting against exploita-
tive competition. In sum, the evolutionary role of selves is to provide a story about 
how the socio-cognitive capacities of early humans was directly correlated with their 
ability to signal and coordinate effectively.7 
 
Selves as economic agents 
 
If the evolutionary gloss above is approximately true, then we have a description of 
the conditions that prompted the emergence of selves. But the real challenge we are 
faced with is showing how the evolution of pre-enculturated biological individuals 
into socialized H. Sapiens is any indication of their economic function (which is not 
the same as, but is clearly connected to, the former two roles). In order to meet this 
challenge, Ross defends the ontological distinction between pre-socialized biological 
individuals (whose behavioral strategies are determined by Mother Nature) and 
                                                          
7 For further discussion of the evolutionary benefits of language and meta-representational ca-
pacities for overcoming strategic exploitation vis-à-vis the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypoth-
esis, see Sterelny (1998, 2007) and Zawidzki (2013).  
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enculturated H. sapiens (whose behavioral strategies are co-determined by social in-
teraction in market systems). Once this distinction is drawn, selves are shown to 
emerge as “virtual” economic agents (2005, pp. 276-279—see also Ross, 2006). 
As Ross stresses, it would get the ontological story backward if we started by 
assuming a well-ordered macroeconomy composed of encultured individuals compet-
ing for resources and then assumed that selves emerged merely “as a technology for 
improved competitiveness” (2005, p. 275). This would wrongly suppose that (1) indi-
vidual persons are economics agents, and (2) that H. Sapiens entered the evolutionary 
scene with well-defined social interests. It’s already been argued that the former con-
junct is a non-starter; whereas the latter would conflict with the socio-cognitive time-
line summarized above. The evaluative capacities needed to interpret and rank options 
as social interests could only arise once competitive and cooperative demands forced 
individuals to strategize to achieve their needs. This is why selves are a necessary 
condition for social interests to arise in the first place. Ross describes this social dy-
namic process as follows: 
 
If we so distinguish individual organisms without reference to any economic prop-
erties, we can subsequently subject them to economic analysis without introducing 
circular reasoning into our ontology. Then we want selves to emerge from the social 
dynamics that can arise when some of these biological individuals become en-
meshed in complex… coordination games. (2005, p. 276) 
 
This passage, in opposition to microeconomic individualism, reverses the story that 
selves emerged from pre-existing economic agents as assumed by Robinson-Crusoe 
metaphysics. It also avoids the circularity of defining selves as purely mathematical 
objects, which would be the case if Ross’s account didn’t go beyond the Samuelsonian 
framework.  
It’s important to note how the emergence story defended by Ross, which distin-
guishes pre-socialized biological individuals from enculturated selves, is taken to be 
an indication of selves’ inherent economic role: 
 
If complex sociality is negatively correlated with straightforward economic agency, 
this should lead us to model some biological individuals, those that got enmeshed 
in complex coordination games with others, as evolving away from such agency. 
As they develop selves, they become different kinds of individuals, and the coex-
tensivity between them and the biological individuals on which they are historically 
based breaks down. In the limit, the microeconomic approach with which we logi-
cally begin stops applying to them very effectively, and an evolutionary macroeco-
nomics is called for. (2005, p. 277) 
 
Because there is a lot of overlap with the previous roles that selves play, two points 
need to be unpacked here: The first point is that Ross wants to use the ontological 
distinction he draws between pre-socialized biological individuals and H. Sapiens 
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with evolved human selves to distinguish a formal economic role for selves. Although 
we could envision and model any strategic situation previously described in a game-
form, only the strategic situations of enculturated selves can be modeled as ‘games’ 
in the sense of classical game theory. In this sense, the games that selves play include 
an information set containing all possible actions that the self can ‘choose’ from, each 
of which is designated by a utility function that corresponds to some socially-deter-
mined interest. As Ross says, “[i]dentifying a scenario as a game presupposes that 
players’ strategy sets have already been constrained by determination of their specific 
utility functions” (2005, p. 278). But the whole point of denying microeconomic in-
dividualism and its Robinson Crusoe metaphysics is that H. Sapiens can’t have well-
formed preferences if they haven’t yet developed selves. Pre-socialized biological in-
dividuals are merely passive recipients of the strategic situation types played by 
Mother Nature via competitive phylogenetic lineages. As proto-agents, biological in-
dividuals are incapable of strategizing (hence, they are ideally modeled with evolu-
tionary game theory). On this first point, I don’t disagree with Ross. 
The second point, however, is that if we are going to model selves as players of 
games—and not as passive recipients of competitive phylogenetic lineages—then the 
games they play must be representative of the strategic environment within which 
they are embedded. This means that games cannot be depicted as isolated social in-
teractions, but as consecutive nodes in an interconnected social network. Conse-
quently, a move in one game may count as a simultaneous move in another game or 
series of games. Recall: this interconnectedness is the basis of the general equilibrium 
problem described in the evolutionary gloss above. That is, within a densely-con-
nected social network selves function as virtual agents, as behavioral profiles that in-
dex information that relevant to the strategies that individuals are likely to play upon 
engaging one another in different contexts. These behavioral profiles not only reduce 
the cognitive load required to decipher the actions of others (because it is embedded 
in the context of the social interaction), but they serve to reinforce normative behav-
iors given their ability to trigger cues or provoke feelings of obligation, sanctioning, 
and what have you, which are indispensable for stabilizing behavior in a nonparamet-
ric choice environment:   
 
People probably do not literally solve problems, that is, actually find optimal solu-
tions to their sets of simultaneous games (except, sometimes, by luck)… Neverthe-
less, most people achieve tolerable success as satisficers over the problem space. 
They do this at the cost of increasingly sacrificing flexibility in the new game situ-
ations. (Ross, 2005, p. 204) 
 
This reiterates the economic importance of selves as devices for behavior stabilization 
since coordination is a solution to optimization problems in both human phylogeny 
and ontogeny, i.e. in evolutionary history and in contemporary social-psychological 
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development. While the context of optimization problems will differ as constraints 
and incentives change, the streamlining of sensible behavior according to norms re-
duces much of the burden that energy-costly strategizing would otherwise demand of 
an individual as he or she navigates the social world. 
I conclude this section by raising an issue, viz. whether the different roles for 
selves that I’ve specified above entail different underlying projects. One the one hand, 
Ross seems to argue that the economic function of selves as behavior stabilization 
technologies follows necessarily from their evolutionary-biological function. But, on 
the other hand, the game-theoretic interpretation of selves would suggest that they are 
nothing more than strategy profiles of socially-embedded individuals; formally, they 
are equivalent to their utility functions. While it could be argued that these are merely 
two complementary roles for selves, one evolutionary-biological, the other methodo-
logical, I will show that, after we distinguish what each of these roles entails, it’s 
harder to reconcile how these two roles could be complementary given that Ross’s 
projects pull in different directions.  
In the next section I describe how Ross operationalizes selves via a game-theo-
retic framework. This exegesis makes vivid the tensions underlying the roles I have 
identified above and points toward a tradeoff that, I will argue, is implicit in his 
broader philosophy of economics.  
 
3. Social-determination, black boxes, and the externality of intentions 
 
In the previous section I summarized how, according to Ross, the emergence of selves 
fostered the enculturation of humans; from this we could infer a general economic 
function for selves which is simultaneously cultural and biological. I now consider 
whether the formal interpretation of selves that Ross provides (per the economic role) 
is at odds with the other two functions. I will argue that although the formal interpre-
tation of selves is logically consistent with the rejection of social atomism and micro-
economic individualism, this interpretation crowds out the explanatory virtues that 
selves provide pertaining to their evolutionary-biological role.  
In this sub-section I delve further into the nuts and bolts of Ross’s formal frame-
work, which he refers to as “game-determination”. It is precisely because Ross thinks 
we cannot look to selves for psychological explanations of behavior that he must say 
something about how to get to such explanations, and he opts to say this: we must 
look to the situation types that orientate selves with respect to one another in a social 
network. These situations, when modeled as interconnected games, should tell us 
something about how individuals will act.  
 
 
 
30 
 
 
3.1 Game-determination 
 
As a framework, game-determination builds upon the narrative-self hypothesis dis-
cussed in section 1: it defines the rules of games according to the institutional con-
straints and normative conventions that undergird a social network, and derives strat-
egies for action from the narratives that selves are constructed from.8 However, one 
obstacle that a game-theoretic account of the coordination of selves needs to overcome 
is how to depict the interconnectedness of social interactions.  
 It was stipulated above that situation types vary according to the type of player 
we are interested in modeling (e.g., pre-socialized biological individuals are ideal can-
didates for evolutionary game theory, whereas social humans with multiple selves 
requires a game theoretic models that permit diverse strategies). As such, asocial ani-
mals and pre-socialized H. sapiens are not the kind of agents that should be modeled 
with classical game theory. This is because their behavioral traits are determined ex-
ogenously by evolutionarily stable strategies rather than by preferences for situation-
specific outcomes. As simple proto-agents, asocial animals are incapable of deviating 
from their natural function and thus exhibit stable behavior from birth to death. By 
contrast, the utility functions of encultured agents’ change over time given that new 
games are continuously unfolding and the network that connects them grows more 
and more nebulous. As selves adjust to changing constraints, they can be ascribed new 
utility functions that are specific to the outcomes of each new situation. This is why 
players of games can be modeled as new agents each time their strategies change. 
However, we cannot assume that coordination is captured merely by iterated game-
play between players that are already familiar with one another; selves arise in order 
to reinforce their own narratives precisely by coordinating with new players and by 
learning which strategies are permitted and which are not. As selves gain new infor-
mation and develop new methods of coordination, the strategies they play are cali-
brated and recalibrated. It is for this reason that Ross says, “we can’t assume our initial 
individuation of agents to remain stable as we let socialization feed back into their 
economic agency profiles” (2005, p. 291). This process of continuous calibration 
                                                          
8 In response to this claim, it could be argued that although selves are shown to play a narrative 
role, this does not entail that the features of real narratives need to be included in or formally 
represented by the mathematical strategies that selves stand for in Ross’ game-theoretic frame-
work. For instance, Ross states that, “the only formal properties needed for selves to play their 
strategic roles as constraints on sub-personal disorder and the membership of the available sets 
of G-level games are those properties associated with preference stability. Any entity with suf-
ficiently stable preferences to ensure that stochastic dominance is respected… would do; this 
needn't necessarily be a narrative self” (my emphasis, personal correspondence). I would agree 
with Ross that the content of peoples’ narratives need not be represented by the preference of 
selves in their games. But one should keep in mind that the issue I am raising here is not that 
the narrative and economic roles should be continuous, but that these two roles lead to further 
tensions in Ross’ separate projects.   
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applies to all interacting agents giving rise to a deterministic web of peripherally un-
folding games.  
 To capture the dynamics of a game-determined framework Ross classifies three 
types, or ‘levels’, of games that agents are engaged in. G-level games depict standard 
game-theoretic situations like prisoners’ dilemmas, assurance games, and pure coor-
dination situations—in these situations the players are modeled as if they know what 
kind of game they’re playing, that is, they know what’s at stake and have evaluated 
their alternatives accordingly. G''-level games depict evolutionary situations in which 
phylogenetic lineages compete to transmit genetic information—in these games aso-
cial animals are passive recipients of natural strategies. G-level and G''-level games 
correspond to classical game theoretic situations and evolutionary game theoretic sit-
uations, respectively. 
 Ross introduces an additional strategic level, G': this level depicts higher-order 
games that are played between agents that are already sculpted by cognitive, norma-
tive, and institutional pressures, but who are uncertain of what game (at the G-level) 
they may play with an opponent or conspecific. So, G' games codify the dispositions 
of players to interact prior to deciding how they each would likely play. Thus, Ross 
states: “Gi' is a game played by two strangers to each other who are already distinctive 
human selves. Its structure is of course determined by their preengagement utility 
functions”—these preengagement utility functions are informed by the background 
and concurrent games that the agent has already played (2005, p. 292). He continues: 
 
By reference to this game we can state the narrative theory of social self-con-
struction as follows: many engagements involve incremental refinements of the 
selves of the (nonstraightforward) agents who play Gi' so that they become new 
agents who, still in Si, will play Gi.  (p. 292) 
 
However, the dispositions that preengagement utility functions represent do not 
strictly determine the outcomes of G' games. They merely establish the background 
conditions (as narrative constraints) that inform selves how they ought to approach a 
strategic situation. What this game-theoretic model provides is a formal platform to 
depict the sending and receiving of signals to coordinate; this affords modelers the 
opportunity to visualize or at least theorize about how players evaluate their bargain-
ing position by deciphering subtle physical and rhetorical signs to determine what 
kind of game shall be played. 
A question that arises then is: at what level of strategic interaction do selves 
emerge such that we can specify them as distinct behavioral profiles? —should selves 
be identified only with the behavioral outcome that is observable as a move in a game 
at the G-level? The revealed-preference interpretation of Ross’s (neo)Samuelsonian 
framework would suggest something like this, prima facie. But this can’t be right for 
it would render the concept of selves redundant—they would effectively be no 
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different than revealed preferences. This leads me to suspect that selves emerge as 
stable agents at the G'-level, which is where signals are sent, received, and deciphered. 
Let’s flesh this out: 
The reason Ross thinks that selves serve a strategic role (within the economic 
role) is because selves correspond to different behavioral profiles prior to engagement 
at the G-level. If we grant this, then there is some intuitive reason for thinking that 
pre-engagement utility functions at the G'-level do correspond to dispositions to act, 
even if those dispositions are not realized (say because an agent perceives deceit and 
changes its strategy). But this means that strategies depicted as moves in G' games 
aren’t easy to define precisely because their outcomes are what we observe as G-level 
coordination. One could entertain many possible alternatives for making sense of what 
actually happens in games at the G'-level: one alternative could be that a prime self 
(which is determined by its pre-engagement utility functions at the G'-level) chooses 
among profiles which it ‘decides’ to deploy in the G-level game. Another alternative 
is that selves at the G'-level are not yet determined and have to bargain at the G'-level 
simultaneously as they compete for a position in the G-level game. It’s not clear which 
interpretations we should take. In a later article on the evolutionary basis of selves, 
Ross clarifies that “…if the subject’s own participation in self-narration is a strategic 
response aimed at coordination with others, then an economic model must interpret 
selves as products of games played among sets of players that can’t include that very 
self” (2006, p. 205). This leads me to believe that unlike either of the alternatives I 
propose, Ross envisions new selves emerging out of the games played at the meta-
strategic level.   
The point one should consider here is that if Ross’s game-determination frame-
work is to be interpreted as a model of market systems where information about how 
individuals behave is exogenous to the games that selves play, then we in fact learn 
little about what selves do. Do they merely represent possibilities to act, or do they 
partake in the selection determination of an appropriate strategy given some incentives 
and constraints?  
It could be argued at this point that there is tension between the different roles 
Ross envisions for selves, primarily because there is some ambiguity about what takes 
place at the G'-level. On the one hand, it seems that Ross’s illustration of the con-
straining effects of social networks seems to suppose that selves are, in fact, not cen-
ters of decision-making, since all strategies in a game-determined framework are ex-
ternally imposed, at one ‘level’ or another. This is supposed to demonstrate that selves 
have only a virtual presence. But, on the other hand, this seems to conflict with the 
evolutionary-biological lessons Ross’s also wants to teach us, which are that selves 
enable pre-socialized biological individuals to become intentional beings (i.e. to take 
the intentional stance toward themselves and others) by sending and receiving signals 
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via a public language. On this reading, the emergence of selves is the emergence of 
intentional action.9 
 
3.2 Selves as black boxes 
 
One problem that stands in the way of further analysis is the apparent duality of the 
projects that selves (in their different roles) are supposed to serve. Ross tells us that 
selves are ontologically equivalent to persons (2005, p. 318). This is because selves 
are narrated into being by social interactions, public conventions, and other histori-
cally significant episodes. Yet, the above exegesis of the economic (mathematical) 
role of selves suggests that they are really abstract entities—we don’t see selves, we 
infer their presence (or existence) by reflecting on the motivations behind our ordinary 
behavioral patterns. Game-determination views selves as the culmination of selection 
pressures and learning opportunities to generate strategy profiles. Strategy profiles are 
represented by selves’ preferences. This includes preferences over the outcomes of 
single games (G-level games) as well as preferences (meta-strategies) over the out-
comes of higher-order games (G’-level games) which influence downward the type 
of games individual selves will play. What these considerations amount to is the self 
being treated as a purely mathematical object: selves just are whatever enables an 
entity to maximize a utility function, and so, they are necessarily tautological. There 
is no method by which to individuate selves prior to an individual’s engagement (or 
pre-engagement) with another where coordination demands the taking of a decision. 
(Recall, this is part of the economic role of selves). 
This dilemma should provoke curiosity from readers. The idea that selves cannot 
formally be individuated (beyond the strategies they represent in G-level games) 
should raise questions about Ross’s overall projects. Recall that Ross has two main 
projects: (1) is to provide a story about how the emergence of socio-cognitive func-
tions enabled humans to engage in market behaviors via fluid coordination; while (2) 
is to provide theoretical foundations for an account of economic agency that is not 
individualistic but still amenable to neoclassical economics. Now, as stated previ-
ously, we need not see the three distinct roles for selves as contradictory or in 
                                                          
9 In fact, it would seem that selves can only emerge in the presence of a public language (or 
public signaling system). Ross continuously extols human language as the primary technology 
for social learning, and hence, as the primary tool by which selves hold other selves accountable 
for their actions. After all, public language is what enables selves to first take the intentional 
stance toward themselves, which is Dennett’s primary weapon against Cartesian accounts of 
cognitive processing (1991b). For Ross, language is the dominant medium by which selves 
convey information to one another about how they will coordinate, and by extension, how they 
solve the general equilibrium problem of consistently strategizing with all other selves in a 
computationally nightmarish social network. 
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competition with one another. But, if these distinct roles indicate contradictory out-
comes for Ross’s two projects, then there is need to consider further what each project 
requires or is committed to.  
Before I take this discussion further, I want to consider a possible challenge to 
my line of inquiry. One could argue that it is, in fact, categorically mistaken to ask 
what “takes place” at the G’-level of a signaling game because such a question pre-
supposes that what players do at the G’-level is psychological or computational in 
nature, which is not the case. The formal interpretation of selves explicitly prohibits 
reading any psychological or computational properties into their behavior because 
their strategies are already fixed by their situation types. This is why selves—that is, 
the narrative constraints that distinguish selves—are left as black boxes.10  In Ross’s 
neoclassical framework, individual actions are produced by virtual economic agents, 
and selves are narrated to signal those actions for the purpose of making their behavior 
intelligible (to others as well as to themselves). In response to this disclaimer, I would 
like to clarify that I do not presume that Ross needs a psychological foundation to 
account for the behavior of selves if by “psychological” we mean an account that 
traces decisions back to propositional-attitudes inside individuals’ heads. But, if we 
permit that psychological ascriptions of attitudes are just conventions of language 
which allow individuals to interact and make sense of each other’s behaviors (which 
Dennett certainly does), then this does not count as psychological in the sense that 
Ross tends to mean it, i.e. as a study of the causal mechanics of individual choice.  
This disclaimer about the psychological foundations of selves is important be-
cause it illustrates the differences I am trying to draw between the formal interpreta-
tion of selves and the real-world economic function of selves which is built upon their 
biological and narrative roles. The formal interpretation leaves selves as black boxes 
because they are whatever maximizes an agent’s payoffs in a game—this appears to 
be a logical consequence of the definition of selves-qua agents—in a game-determi-
nation framework. However, that Ross clearly wishes to externalize agent intention-
ality via the distributing effects of language and thereby account for the cultural-evo-
lutionary dynamics of signaling phenomena, the black-boxing of selves appears to be 
a methodological consequence of network complexity.11  
                                                          
10 In the original passage, Ross advises “let us for now just understand a narrative constraint in 
the vague operational sense of whatever it is that leads a given group of people to judge some 
behavioral sequences as ones in which earlier behavioral patterns explain others, and other se-
quences as ones in which explanation must draw on synchronic factors exogenous to behavioral 
patterns alone. (2005, p. 286)  
 
11 The innovation of a G'-level for strategic reasoning is designed to combat a flaw in Frank’s 
(1988) theory of emotional signaling. Although Ross agrees with Frank that emotions are inte-
gral for non-conventional (i.e. non-linguistic) signaling, he argues that Frank overestimates 
their socio-cognitive importance in the broader process of strategic coordination—that is, 
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Thus far, we’ve been introduced to a picture of selves that is intuitively plural: 
selves can only be sensibly understood in the context of other selves. By abandoning 
all vestiges of Cartesian epistemology, anti-individualism makes it implausible to con-
ceive of a self independently of the structures that give its actions meaning and direct-
edness. While this picture is not intrinsically problematic, it does introduce restrictions 
on what philosophers of economics can expect to learn about selves. This is why it 
seems imperative that we focus on the methodological restrictions, since this tacitly 
permits further study of the dynamics that lead to the regulation of individual behavior 
via selves. In the remainder of this section I will highlight a few places that we can 
read Ross as endorsing the view that selves are more like the biological and narrative 
roles I described in section 1.2. This should signal to readers that the formal interpre-
tation of selves is mostly a dead end if we hope to learn anything about real-life social 
dynamics.  
 
3.3 Externalizing intentionality—or, what coordination implies for individuals with 
selves 
 
As I discussed above, there is much room for possible misinterpretation about what 
coordination at the G'-level entails since it is not a visible interaction. For instance, it 
may seem as if G' games are “binding preplay” for the negotiation of the G-level 
game. On this reading, social coordination is a cooperative effort since both players 
seek to match their respective expectations at the G'-level which commits both of them 
to a mutually optimal G-level game.  However, to show why this is the case we need 
to consider a cluster of related issues:  
The first part of the cluster pertains to the reasons why Ross does not to assent to 
the presumption that higher-order coordination is necessarily cooperative. One reason 
is straightforwardly strategic: Human selves in the real world may have good reason 
not to cooperate at the G'-level if they suspect that the resulting G-level game yields 
vulnerabilities or uncertainties they wish to avoid. This noncooperative thesis follows 
naturally from the theory of narrative construction and constraint described above 
since the molding of selves is shown to be an incremental process. It is due to the 
underlying dynamics of narrative construction that players can’t “simply assume self-
predictability; [rather] they have to act so as to make themselves predictable” (2005, 
p. 293). 
Another reason why higher-order coordination isn’t necessarily cooperative is 
that it would be implausible for a self to cooperate with all other selves simultane-
ously. This stems from the inherent complexity and interconnectedness of the social 
networks that scaffold human biographies. Recall that a move in one game is 
                                                          
Frank’s account fails to incorporate culturally evolved conventional signals that mediate be-
tween G''-level and G-level games (2005, pp. 297–316; see also Ross & Dumouchel, 2004). 
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simultaneously a move in another game (or series of peripheral games); even if a 
player intended to negotiate at the G'-level in an attempt to show commitment toward 
playing a particular G-game that is optimal for both players, this may be interpreted 
as a display of noncooperation in another G'-level game by a third party, leading to 
competitive play in a subsequent peripheral G-level game with that third party: 
 
A person can’t keep the various games she simultaneously plays with different peo-
ple in encapsulated silos, so a move in a game Gi' with the stranger will also repre-
sent a move in other games Gk, . . . , n with more familiar partners—because these 
partners are watching, and will draw information relevant to Gk, . . . , n from what 
she does in Gi'… Both of these points can be expressed by saying that nature 
doesn’t hand people cards telling them which games they’re in when. Games have 
to be determined dynamically—and determination processes are themselves games. 
(Ross, 2005, p. 293) 
 
Higher-order coordination compounds the complexity of the general equilibrium 
problem that selves emerged to solve—i.e. the systems of pressures that underwrite 
the dynamics of broad social coordination are “computationally intractable” from the 
perspective of a serial processor. This is why the concept of narrative constraint is 
integral for Ross’s concept of game-determination: the concept of selves is not just 
useful for understanding how individuals stabilize their behaviors, but also for mini-
mizing (or streamlining) the number of strategies that an individual has to be prepared 
to deploy. Recall that this is exactly the evolutionary challenge that self-emergence 
introduced. In response to this challenge, it was argued that people achieve tolerable 
success as satisficers over the general equilibrium problem space. They do this at the 
cost of increasingly sacrificing flexibility in new game situations. Thus, the general 
success of coordinating—satisficing rather than maximizing—follows from the ten-
dency of individuals to avoid the kind of destructive games that would require energy-
costly computation of the kind likely to cause coordination errors: 
 
This general fact itself helps to explain the prevailing stability of selves in a feed-
back relationship. It is sensible for people to avoid attempts at coordination with 
highly unstable selves. Given the massive interdependency among people, this in-
centivizes everyone to regulate the stability of those around them through dispen-
sation of social rewards and punishments. As described earlier, this is how and why 
we get selves, as stabilizing devices, in the first place. (Ross, 2005, p. 294) 
 
In order for selves to develop, that is, in order for the process of enculturation to take 
place and for coordination problems to be solved by persons, we must presuppose the 
development of robust cognitive and linguistic tools. At the same time, cognitive and 
linguistic tools cannot evolve further without stabilizing devices, i.e. selves, to direct 
and orient their use as media for communication. 
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 Moreover, Ross continuously extolls the importance of language as the primary 
technology for scaffolded learning, and hence, as the primary tool by which selves 
hold other selves accountable for their actions (2004, 2007b). After all, public lan-
guage is what enables selves to first take the intentional stance toward themselves; as 
well, it is the dominant medium by which selves convey information to one another 
about how they will coordinate, and by extension, how they solve the general equilib-
rium problem of consistently strategizing with all other selves in a highly complex 
social network. Public language isn’t just some vehicle of information transmission 
that happens to be useful—it is, from an evolutionary and development perspective, 
the socio-cognitive tool that allows pre-socialized H. Sapiens to become selves. Ross 
states that: “For Dennett, narrative structure essentially requires language. This de-
rives not from the implicit analysis of narrative itself… but from the [multiple drafts 
model of consciousness] …” (2005, p. 286). Moreover, language provides a structure 
that is “ontologically prior to and wider than” the particular pressures that constrain a 
narrative self. In this way, public language—understood as a relatively fixed system 
of information transfer—provides the right kind of external scaffold for judgments to 
be made (1) by selves about their collective personality, and (2) by other selves for 
the purpose of policing norms.  
 
4. Social selves versus sub-personal selves 
 
Let’s take stock of the discussion thus far. Aside from the primary concern that there 
are multiple roles for selves, another point of contention concerns what makes up a 
self – or rather, what gives different selves their identities? I argued that, for Ross, 
selves are triangulations of brain activity, social interaction, and normative con-
straints. This idea coincides with the idea that selves do more than serve a formal role 
for game-theoretic representation in a neoclassical framework. It suggests that the 
narratives that persons rely on to guide their behaviors are stable despite the recalci-
trant complexity of their sources. The recurring problem for Ross is that some (most) 
social facts do not remain constant, and so there is a deep theoretical need to ground 
our understanding of selves in something firm, something measurable.  
 
4.1 Against the view that selves are sub-personal 
 
In trying to get a handle on what anchors selves’ identities, philosophers of economics 
have interpreted Ross’ account in one of two polarizing ways, conceiving selves as 
either sub-personal or supra-personal entities. As a foil for this discussion, I appeal to 
Davis’s (2011) analysis of selves which interprets them as sub-personal neural 
agents. I contrast my own position against Davis’s and show that the differences in 
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how we interpret Ross illustrate different ways of envisioning future research on the 
topic. To jump right into it, Davis characterizes Ross as follows: 
 
Ross’ neuroeconomics-based view… treats these different neural systems as rela-
tively independent neural systems and thus as a person’s multiple selves. As such, 
they are sub-personal multiple selves rather than supra-personal ones, and he ac-
cordingly investigates what a person is from the perspective of neuroscience rather 
than from social psychology. (Davis, 2011, p. 125) 
 
As a rough-and-ready description of what selves are, I find this description misses the 
mark. However, because Davis does provide an otherwise remarkable analysis of 
Ross’ agenda, we should look more carefully at how he understands “sub-personal 
multiple selves” for it brings additional clarity to Ross’ three conceptions of selves. 
Davis provides a very clear and concise account of the evolutionary pressures 
that, for Ross, would drive neural agents – behaving as a semi-cohesive unit – to seek 
out partnerships with other clusters of neural agents: he states that  
 
Because evolution has confined sets of sub-personal neural agents to the same in-
dividual human bodies, it turns out to be symbiotically in their interest to cooperate 
with one another in order that the body they jointly inhabit survives. Further, as 
whole individuals’ survival also depends on interaction with other whole individu-
als (who are similarly the result of internal coordination games). (Davis, 2011, p. 
128) 
 
To be fair, the cultural-evolutionary gloss that Davis proceeds to give is a faithful 
depiction of Ross’ account of selves as a technology for behavioral stabilization, so it 
accords with my analysis above: selves facilitate intrapersonal and interpersonal ac-
tion through which individuals, conceived as coalitions of neural agents, sculpt and 
re-sculpt themselves. Where I disagree with Davis is in his presuming that these neural 
agents constitute selves, and so, are intrinsically sub-personal. This may seem like 
merely a technicality, a quibbling over proper use of jargon, but, I think a few points 
are worth fleshing out which will distinguish my contribution as a constructive criti-
cism of Ross.  
Davis’s intended question “whether a single individual should play any role in a 
neuro-cellular economics” (2011, pp. 125-132) does not clearly represent either of 
Ross’ projects. How Davis proceeds to answer this question—which envisions Ross 
trying to unify of two domains of economic inquiry (i.e. the behavior of neurons and 
the behavior of individuals)—ignores many of the subtleties I’ve tried to flesh out in 
this paper. To be clear, Ross does argue that the internal games that neural agents play 
have an outward effect on the organism as a whole; but, he is adamant that we not 
conflate this level of activity with the activities that selves engage in, viz. conventional 
signal-sending. Recall that the goal of introducing cultural dynamics into a game-
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determined framework (codified as G'-level strategic play) was to disembark from the 
phylogenetically determined games of pre-socialized biological individuals. 
Perhaps what I’ve argued thus far is not a radical departure from Davis’s inter-
pretation because I essentially agree with him that there is an ambiguity in Ross’ ar-
gumentation—to quote him again:  
 
It’s one thing to say that individuals have a capacity to reflexively produce self-
narratives or discursive representations of themselves, and it is another thing to say 
that these representations are specifically whole individual representations of them-
selves: self-reports rather than simply representations of different aspects of them-
selves… Nothing in Ross’ analysis of interaction between individual’s sub-persona 
selves quite tells us how they collectively graduate to producing whole individual 
self-reports. (Davis, 2011, p. 129) 
 
This seems to get to the heart of the problem I raised in section 2, viz. that it isn’t clear 
how self-signaling works at the meta-strategic G'-level prior to selves settling on a 
course of action. My concern with Davis’s interpretation of Ross is that it misrepre-
sents the inherent tension and trade-off that one is confronted with if selves are con-
ceived as black boxes (let alone three of them).  
For instance, Davis inquires whether (for Ross) individuals’ representations of 
themselves might be alternatively of one neural system, and then another neural sys-
tem, and so forth, thus indicating that the identity of the whole person is a constant 
flux of selves (2011, p. 129). This is meant to suggest that Ross’ account is problem-
atic because each ‘self’ is bound up in some set of narratives that all depend on equally 
unstable self-narratives. But Davis’s inquiry misrepresents the relationship between 
selves and persons—it suggests that the potential instability of selves is the result of 
causal relationship between underlying neural activity and the content of conscious-
ness. To understand why this is wrong-headed, recall the lesson of Dennett’s multiple 
drafts model of consciousness, which was intended to alleviate the temptation to think 
of mental content (perceptions, judgments) as occupying discrete regions in the brain 
(1991b). If we were to probe an individual’s brain during a perception, we would not 
find a locus of experience that represents that perception. The experience itself is a 
stream of multi-track processes that are distributed throughout the brain. Likewise, if 
we could probe individuals to solicit information about their selves, we would not find 
collections of discrete stories that correspond to memories and other biographical 
mental content. The reason selves are black boxes (on any interpretation) is because 
they afford possibilities to act. Selves do not represent neural information; they rep-
resent solutions to coordination dilemmas that are the result of a continuous and pre-
dictive updating of their ecological niche. Demanding what makes up a self is like 
demanding where a propositional attitude is located in the brain. We may distinguish 
patterns of neural connectivity and on that basis draw correlations with a person’s 
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outward behavior (including their verbal reports of conscious experience). But this 
does not give way, by analogy, to an account of selves that is sub-personal. 
Although Ross sufficiently distinguishes his position from Glimcher-style neu-
roeconomics,12 a close examination of his (2006) and (2007b) articles on the evolu-
tionary and ecological basis of human social intelligence further supports a view of 
selves that is intrinsically rooted in social dynamics, not in sub-personal neural activ-
ity:  
 
…human personalities—selves, that is—have been made phylogenetically possible 
and normatively central through the environmental manipulations achieved collec-
tively by humans over their history, while particular people are ontogenetically 
created by cultural dynamics unfolding in this context… individual people are 
themselves systems governed by distributed-control dynamics… and so must for 
various explanatory and predictive purposes be modeled as bargaining communi-
ties. These theses together imply that adequate models of people—and not just of 
groups of people—will be social-dynamic models through and through. (Ross, 
2006, p.200) 
 
What Ross does say about the economic study of neural activity does not endorse 
Davis’ reading of selves as rooted in a “neuroeconomics-based” approach. I quote 
Ross at length: 
 
Taking account of the way in which people are distinct from their brains in the point 
of my suggested appeal to neuroscientific control theory… This precisely implies 
the distinction between brain-level individualism and person-level individualism, 
especially if one of the advantages people bring to the table by contrast with brains 
is faster response to the flexibility encoded in social learning. Brains bring com-
pensating advantages of their own, as we should expect. As the discussion of asset 
valuation above suggests, their reduced plasticity relative to socially anchored 
selves can help maintain objectivity in circumstances where herd effects occur. It 
is just when we don’t conflate maximization of utility by brains with goal achieve-
ment by selves that we have some hope of using data about the former as a source 
of theoretically independent constraints on processing models of the latter. (2006, 
pp. 207-208 emphasis added) 
 
Now, what Ross means by “using data about the former [utility maximization by 
brains] as a source of theoretically independent constraints on processing models of 
                                                          
12 Ross provides a rich analysis of the differences between Glimcher’s (2004) neuroeconomics 
approach (Ross, 2008) and Ainslie’s picoeconomics (Ross, 2005, pp. 322-334, 337-353). The 
lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that his interpretation of selves more closely aligns with 
Ainslie’s account of sub-personal interests, which are not neural agents. 
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the latter [goal achievement by selves]” is not entirely clear.13 But, what is clear is that 
it does not justify Davis’ claims that selves are neural agents. 
 
4.2 Neuroscientific control theory and participatory sense-making  
 
I argued above that Davis’ inquiry whether self-representations alternatively pick out 
different neural agents misrepresents the relationship between selves and the activities 
of the brain. Nowhere does Ross (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) refer to his own approach 
to multiple-selves as “neuroeconomics-based”. Moreover, he repeatedly cautions neu-
roeconomists to keep personal-level information distinct from sub-personal-level con-
tent for it otherwise “encourages a slide back into an individualist conception in which 
people are taken to be mereologically composed out of functional modules that locally 
supervene on neuronal groups” (Ross, 2006, p. 207). Now, one may ask: if I ultimately 
agree with Davis that there is an ambiguity in Ross, why does it matter how we dif-
ferentiate our understanding of selves? Why go to the trouble of arguing that they are 
not neural if we can’t, in the first place, determine what they are?  
In clarifying Ross’ account of selves we are forced to confront the fact that indi-
vidual behavior is inextricably tied up in dynamics above and below the personal-
level. To this end, however, it is integral to understanding these dynamics that we 
distinguish the study of biological individuals, who are coalitions of neural agents 
forged from biological evolution, from persons, who are products of (some form of) 
cultural evolution. Even if we cannot identify or agree upon a stable vehicle for the 
study of selves, a philosophically conservative analysis nonetheless informs us of 
what possible roles they can (and can’t) play, both within economics and in other 
disciplines. In bringing this paper to a close, I thus consider two ways we can proceed 
given that selves are left as black boxes. One move involves reading Ross’ account as 
a cautionary tale; the other involves a direct application of the black-box concept. 
First, with regard to the study of intrapersonal and intertemporal choice, behav-
ioral economics offers a dizzying array of options for modeling sub-personal selves. 
One family of models which has gained considerable popularity takes a “dualistic” 
approach toward the individual, wherein the decision-process is modeled as a game 
between a long-run “planner” self and short-run “doer” self (this is based on the prin-
ciple-agent design made famous by Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Following this format, 
                                                          
13 He does say that, “Attention to AI and neuroscience forces us to take seriously some limits 
on the sensitivity of behavior and agency to all the dynamical forces present in an environment. 
Complex systems can only manifest agency if they achieve stable integration of information in 
such a way as to shield them, up to a point, from dynamical perturbations” (2006, p. 205). 
Elsewhere (Ross, 2007a, 2009) he does consider ways of reconciling what he calls “molar” and 
“molecular” approaches to economic agency. This involves a multi-scale approach to agency 
that brings neuroeconomics into the picture, but leaves it as an ontologically separate endeavor. 
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there have been no shortage of attempts by researchers to map these selves onto un-
derlying processes in the brain, viz. “controlled” processes and “automatic” processes 
(cf. Benabou & Tirole, 2002; Benhabib & Bisin, 2005; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 
2005). The models dictate that the outcome of an agent’s choice, when conceived as 
trade-off between temporally distinct selves, represents endogenous motivations that 
are causally determined by the activation of cognitive systems where these processes 
take place.14 Another family of dual-self models takes this idea a step further, attempt-
ing to directly observe how the brain optimizes rewards given “budget constraints” 
over its energy resources. For instance, research conducted by McClure et al. (2004), 
McClure et al. (2007), and Brocas & Carrillo (2008a, 2008b) indicates that decisions 
are, in fact, processed in domain-specific systems in the brain, and on this basis, they 
believe they can isolate the determinants of myopic behaviors.15 
While there are many reasons to be wary of how both families of models conceive 
of sub-personal selves, it’s possible that the second family of models, which are more 
explicit about their domain of investigation, could benefit from what Ross refers to as 
neuroscientific control theory (2006, p. 207). Control theory tells us what we can ex-
pect to learn about selves if we define them as a separate kind of neural agent, which 
Ross refuses to do. In performing valuations different from intentional selves, brains 
are accountable for the type and integrity of the information available to persons. 
While control theory does not tell us how to encode information at the level of social 
learning, it constrains the strategies that intentional selves, as economic agents, can 
develop insofar as their own signals are translated through a medium that the brain 
was designed to manage. It is for this reason that Ross’s envisions a fruitful partner-
ship between evolutionary game theory and neuroeconomics, with the former provid-
ing the methodological scaffolding for social dynamics and the latter defining the 
(neural) capacities of its agents.  
Second, growing interest in the study of distributed cognitive systems has brought 
philosophers, cognitive scientists, and linguists into close proximity. For instance, 
embodied and enactive approaches to cognition have speculated about how a commu-
nity of language-users might achieve social coordination and develop behavioral-lin-
guistic conventions without assenting to an over-arching theory of mental 
                                                          
14 Though, it is a matter worthy of debate how behavioral economists envision and model the 
activation of cognitive processes, and how this relates to different categories of decision-making 
at the individual level. There has been no systematic attempt to understand how dualistic models 
of this kind conceive of selves with regard to different levels of reward conflict. Put another 
way, many behavioral economic approaches to dual-self modeling conflate conflict observed 
at the neural level with experienced conflict at the personal level. 
 
15 However, alternative research by Glimcher et al. (2007) and Kable & Glimcher (2007) sug-
gests that reward and information systems aren’t as discrete as they may appear, and that the 
decision-making process is distributed throughout the entire connectome, implying a more uni-
tary picture of the brain (cf. Rustichini, 2008; Vromen, 2011). 
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representation (which would require linguists and cognitive scientists to figure out 
how people “read” each other’s minds). Accounts such as Hutto (2008), Hutto & Myin 
(2013), McGeer (2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2013) suggest that individuals do not 
read minds, but rather “make” them or “shape” them through commissive speech acts. 
These speech acts build narratives, reinforce social norms, and enable individuals to 
become intentional beings within a community. The problem with such accounts is 
they are highly theoretical, they lack a means to quantify the act of sense-making in a 
community. For instance, De Jaeger & Di Paolo (2007) venture an enactive model of 
social cognition, by which they represent the process of participatory sense-making 
as a dyadic interaction between two individuals. While their model is instructive, its 
abstractness undermines the process of enculturation that we see Ross so carefully 
trying to construct in his own framework. An account of selves that is black-boxed 
fits in here because the object of study for enactive social-cognition is not the individ-
ual person, but the dyadic relation between social selves. Cast in terms of conditional 
games (cf. Sterling, 2012) the strategic interactions that lead to intersubjective agree-
ment are the kind of social relationships that Ross’s account is poised to explore.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The motivation for writing this paper was to critically evaluate the concept of human 
selves, and to locate ambiguity or inconsistency that results from conflicting roles 
played by selves in Ross’s framework. In essence, my argument was that there is a 
discrepancy between the biographical interpretation of selves and the formal interpre-
tation of selves. The biographical interpretation suggests that selves are a product of 
social and neural activity—it was for this reason that Ross views selves as “ontologi-
cally equivalent to whole people” (2005, p. 318). Under this interpretation I distin-
guished three distinct roles and fleshed out details of each. By contrast, the formal 
interpretation of selves was shown to enable modelers to individuate strategies played 
by selves without needing to individuate selves per se. On this reading selves just are 
the preference profiles of distinct economic agents. While it’s entirely possible that 
the biographical details could serve as inputs for strategies, it’s not clear how this can 
be done. This is because Ross is notoriously critical of behavioral economic programs 
that seek to isolate and codify dispositions and/or psychological mechanisms that un-
derwrite individual choice-behavior. Most readers familiar with Ross’s framework 
should have a general understanding of these various roles even if they have not 
thought through the implications themselves. 
However, the real issue with which I am concerned, which I’ve attempted to clar-
ify in this paper, is that selves are not designed for a practical need but a theoretical 
one, which is to construct (1) an evolutionary story about the cognitive functions of 
humans, and (2) to show how the concept of economic agency can be salvaged given 
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that humans are not ideal agents. I think this is the reason for ambivalence about their 
interpretation which I’ve described as a separate role: they are mathematical entities 
insofar as they are individuated according to their utility functions, which is their eco-
nomic role; and they are behavioral stabilization devices which developed as humans 
learned to distribute the cognitive burden of resolving coordination, which is their 
evolutionary role. And spanning both these roles, selves are also biographical entities 
insofar as they enable people to manage different personas and identities as they par-
ticipate in market contexts. The problem we are thus faced with is not reconciling 
these separate roles, but in finding a way to realize Ross’ projects which, which seem 
to demand properties of all these roles simultaneously.  
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Chapter 4 
From selves to systems: On the intrapersonal and  
intraneural dynamics of decision making1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The idea of a ‘divided self’ has been the source of folk-wisdom for centuries. How-
ever, new research into the cognitive and behavioral foundations of decision-making 
suggests that this idea is more than just a metaphor. Our minds—and brains—appear 
to be divided in interesting if unexpected ways. In support of this, evidence suggests 
that many basic decision errors stem from inner processes over which individuals have 
no direct control. From the perspective of behavioral decision research, this is monu-
mental. Studying the origins of decision errors, may help researchers to understand 
more complex ‘failures’ of rationality, like weakness of will, procrastination, and even 
addiction. Yet, there are still many uncertainties about the divided mind-brain and its 
relation to basic decisions errors and self-control problems.  
The literature projects two methods for understanding decision errors and self-
control problems. One method interprets individual behavior as a dynamic process. 
Multiple-self models conceive decisions as the outcome of a strategic exchange (a 
game) between ‘selves’. Selves are just a formal representation of a person’s compet-
ing interests. Multiple-self modeling is a common practice used by economists and 
decision theorists who wish to understand the conditions that lead to self-control prob-
lems. Yet, another method studies how brains process information. Dual-process and 
dual-system theories provide a multi-purpose framework which differentiates ‘higher’ 
and ‘lower’ cognitive processing. It is believed that some ‘systems’ are fast and auto-
matic, and therefore error-prone, while others are slow and deliberative. The study of 
information processing is common among social and cognitive psychologists who 
wish to explain the causes of decision errors. 
Until recently, these two approaches were kept relatively separate from one an-
other. Yet, new trends reveal interesting collaborations between economists and psy-
chologists. Now researchers are investigating how the insights of dual-process and 
dual-system theories might be used to inform multiple-self economic models. To this 
end, researchers have tried to integrate various features of these two approaches, and 
have, in turn, produced a wide array of psychologically sophisticated multi-agent 
                                                          
1 This chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Methodology, in a special issue on 
“Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Behavioral Economics”. I am grateful to Magdalena Małecka 
and Michiru Nagatsu of the TINT Center for Excellence in Helsinki for organizing the work-
shop from which this paper developed, May 22-23, 2017. 
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models. While different examples of multi-agent models (henceforth, “MaMs”) can 
be found throughout the behavioral sciences, MaMs in particular have two core fea-
tures: (1) their primary level of analysis is not personal but intrapersonal; (2) their 
representation of the intrapersonal dynamics of decision-making is based on infor-
mation processes and systems. These two features set MaMs apart from traditional 
economic models and psychological theories which only adhere to one of these core 
features. 
While MaMs seem poised to provide better understanding of the causes of deci-
sion errors and self-control problems, there are several key issues that pertain to how 
these models are conceived and how they afford scientific understanding. On the one 
hand, there is already a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the terms “selves” and 
“systems”. In economics, selves have many meanings and many extensions; these 
range from the formal to the social to the evolutionary (Elster, 1987; Ross, 2005, 2006; 
Grayot, 2017). Likewise, in social and cognitive psychology, there have been many 
debates with regard to what counts as a cognitive system, and what discriminates cog-
nitive systems from one another (Evans, 2006, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). On 
the other hand, and more importantly for this paper, there is ambiguity surrounding 
the very idea of intrapersonal dynamics. This second form of ambiguity is primarily 
due to the conflating of different levels at which decisions are made. 
While some of the above problems are recognized (but unresolved), others seem 
not to have not been recognized at all. Moreover, there seems to be little concern over 
whether either of these ambiguities may affect the scientific value of MaMs. In what 
follows, I provide a systematic analysis of MaMs by way of three separate claims. 
 
Claim 1: MaMs are conceptually ambiguous. There have been some attempts to clar-
ify the meaning of the terms “selves” and “systems” in the philosophical literature on 
economics and psychology; however, it remains uncertain and therefore contested 
what the terms refer to and pick out. Claim 1 first establishes that selves and systems 
are conceptually ambiguous prior to the integration of multiple-self models and dual-
process and dual-system theories; it then demonstrates that MaMs perpetuate concep-
tual ambiguity by bringing these terms into close proximity via integration. 
 
Claim 2: MaMs are ontologically ambiguous. Because it is uncertain what selves and 
systems refer to or pick out, their roles as intrapersonal and/or intraneural agents may 
generate ontological ambiguity. This ambiguity is twofold. How selves and systems 
interact and generate (or resolve) conflict is obscured by the fact that MaMs appeal to 
both personal-level and subpersonal-level descriptions of agent capacities. In some 
instances, this conflation reveals a deeper ambiguity over the functional interpretation 
of conflict. 
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Claim 3: It is uncertain how MaMs afford scientific understanding. Claim 3 is based 
on an analysis of three cases from behavioral decision research. The conceptual and 
ontological ambiguities identified by claims 1 and 2 indicate that MaMs lack explan-
atory power, and this undermines their scientific value. I argue that this is likely a 
result of researchers failing to define their target of explanation. 
 
This paper has the following structure: In section 2, I provide an overview of the 
emergence of MaMs. This lays the groundwork for my analysis and establishes the 
first claim about conceptual ambiguity. In section 3, I argue that different kinds inte-
grations of multiple-self models and dual-system theories leads to different types of 
ontological ambiguity, thus establishing the second claim. In section 4, I analyze three 
examples of MaMs, and I show how that each model exemplifies conceptual and on-
tological ambiguity. In section 5, I then consider how MaMs afford scientific under-
standing. I argue that there are fundamental problems which pertain to how they con-
ceive internal conflict and how they explain reasoning errors. I then consider possible 
rebuttals to my claims. Section 6 concludes. 
  
2. The emergence of multi-agent models: a brief overview 
 
This paper interprets multi-agent models as the integration of multiple-self economic 
models and dual-system psychological theories. However, integration can take many 
forms and can mean many things.2   For this reason, it will be helpful to first examine 
how economists and psychologists understand their models and theories so that we 
can differentiate features unique to each. This will help to illustrate why there is so 
much confusion surrounding the emergence of MaMs.  
 
2.1 From selves to systems and back 
 
From the perspective of economics, self-control problems are provocative not just 
because they can lead to violations of expected utility theory, but also because they 
blatantly contradict neoclassical conceptions of the economic agent. Multiple-self 
models thus emerged as a means to resolve these problems. While early intertemporal 
choice models were not interested in representing the psychological aspects of 
                                                          
2  Integration is a concept with some philosophical baggage. From the perspective of philosophy 
of science, integration is frequently associated with interdisciplinarity. It is, however, a matter 
of debate whether the crossing of disciplinary boundaries – say, through the sharing of concepts 
and methods – constitutes genuine integration. This paper does not make any strong assump-
tions about integration. Rather tellingly, it is because decision researchers don’t take part in 
such meta-theoretic debates that I conjecture integration is a vague concept. For philosophical 
discussions about integration and interdisciplinary in the behavioral sciences, see Grüne-Yanoff 
(2015, 2016).   
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decision-making (cf. Samuelson, 1937), innovations by Strotz (1955) and Phelps & 
Pollak (1968) demonstrated how ‘generational’ dynamics could lead to preference 
changes. The idea behind these models is that a person’s latent preferences could be 
modeled as competing interests, which can be distinguished by unique value func-
tions. As a precursor to modern multi-agent models, these generational models clev-
erly illustrated how myopic and weak-willed behaviors could be rationalized as a 
tradeoff between short-term and long-term selves.  
Thaler & Shefrin (1981; cf. Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) were among the first to cap-
italize on this idea. Their “dual-self” model interpreted motivational conflict as a game 
between a long-run “planner” self and a short-run “doer” self. Though this was based 
on prevailing theories of mental accounting (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler 
1985), Shefrin & Thaler indicated that dual-self models were consistent with neuro-
science evidence of the time (cf. Fuster, 1980). However, it wasn’t until the late 1980’s 
that researchers began to make explicit connections between economics and psychol-
ogy. For instance, Elster (1987) and Loewenstein (1996, 2000) based their interpreta-
tions of short-term and long-term selves on psychological models of “hot” and “cold” 
emotional states. This precipitated early attempts by decision researchers to integrate 
multiple-self models with dual-processing models of cognition.  
In sum, the partitioning of individuals into selves, each of which could be defined 
by an exclusive value function, enabled economists to make sense of decision anom-
alies, like impulsive consumption habits and self-defeating preference reversals.3 
However, as intrapersonal and intertemporal choice models have become more psy-
chologically sophisticated, it’s become less obvious how selves relate to the underly-
ing causal and physiological processes of decision-making. I return to this point 
shortly. 
By contrast, psychologists interested in the causes of decision errors have sought 
to understand how information is perceived, organized, and produces action. In a 
word, they study information processes. Since the 1970’s (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977), dual-process models help to understand how individuals ‘attend’ to and process 
stimuli. This has inspired a cottage industry in social and cognitive psychology. The 
classic interpretation of dual-process theory is that it differentiates “fast”, “reactive”, 
and “automatic” cognitive processes from “slow”, “controlled”, and “deliberative” 
ones (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Epstein, 1994; Stanovich & West, 2000; Lieber-
man, 2003). The importance of this distinction is that it allows researchers to distin-
guish higher cognitive processing, which is associated with the ability to make 
                                                          
3 For overviews of the history of time-discounting models and analyses of time preferences, see 
Loewenstein (1992) and Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue (2002); For recent surveys 
on multiple-self modeling with regard to time, see Soman et al (2005) and Heilmann (2010). 
For a discussion of time-discounting models in relation to disciplinary integration, see Grüne-
Yanoff (2015). 
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deliberative and informed judgments, from lower, more primitive forms of infor-
mation processing, which are associated with emotional, visceral behavioral re-
sponses.  
Efforts to distinguish clusters of processes have helped psychologists to identify 
which processes are involved in different decision situations. In this way, dual-system 
theories of cognition have emerged as an extrapolation (and perhaps, as a simplifica-
tion) of dual-process models; principally, they explain how the differential activation 
of cognitive modes can support more complex mental operations, such as perceptual 
learning, rule-following and deductive inference, and counter-factual reasoning (Ev-
ans, 2006, 2008; Frankish & Evans, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  
Yet, the concept of a cognitive system remains somewhat ambiguous. Where 
dual-system theories initially served to connect disparate bodies of evidence in the 
dual-process literature, the concept of a system has taken on a perplexing array of 
qualitative and quantitative features by being transplanted into economic optimization 
models.4 Notable economic psychologists have used the dual-system approach to test 
and predict a wide range of decision phenomena, from the specific effects of cognitive 
load on memory and computation, to the more general effects of priming on task judg-
ment and selection (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005; 
Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014). These forays into the analysis 
of dual-systems upon judgment and decision-making have a rich history in the Heu-
ristics and Biases program, as pioneered by Tversky & Kahneman (1973; 1974; cf. 
Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982).  
However, things get complicated when advances in dual-process and dual-system 
psychology are integrated with the multiple-self modeling techniques of economics. 
For example, Benabou & Tirole (2002, 2004), Bernheim & Rangel (2004), Benhabib 
& Bisin (2005), Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2005) and Fudenberg & Levine (2006) 
each have sought to characterize the contradictory tendencies of temporally distinct 
selves by investigating how controlled and automatic processes influence choice be-
haviors over time. In some instances, the intrapersonal dynamic between sequential 
selves is taken to establish the limitations on the decision-maker’s ability to exhibit 
self-control (Benabou & Tirole, 2002, 2004; Fudenberg & Levine, 2006). In other 
instances, the conflict between an individual’s desire to consume now or later is in-
terpreted as a “trade-off” between distinct systems, whose aims are regulated by the 
activation of different cognitive processes (Benhabib & Bisin, 2005; Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2005). Where the former integrative approaches presume a dual-self 
                                                          
4 There are numerous debates about what constitutes a system in the dual-process literature (cf. 
Evans, 2006, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). One solution to this problem is to collate pro-
cesses according to their generalized functions. This has resulted in the use of more neutral 
terminology: System 1 vs. System 2 (Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & Evans, 2000) and Type 1 
vs. Type 2 (Evans, 2012). 
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conception of the decision-maker that is temporally divided, the latter starts with a 
dual-system conception of decision-maker who is psychologically divided. These are 
paradigm examples of multi-agent models.  
Going one step further, some neuroeconomic approaches to decision-making 
have modeled brain processes based on what economists perceive to be ‘optimizing 
procedures’. This technique presumes that the brain has limited energy resources and 
that it must allocate those resources efficiently in order to satisfy rewards. In this way, 
the brain is modeled as an optimizer with budget constraints. Research conducted by 
McClure et al (2004) and McClure et al. (2007), and further results obtained by Brocas 
& Carrillo (2008a, 2008b, 2014), suggest that individual decisions are the outcome of 
strategic interactions between domain-specific systems. This gives credence to the 
belief that resource allocation in the brain adheres to economic principles of optimi-
zation.5  
 
2.2 Conceptual ambiguity surrounding selves and systems  
 
While it may appear that multiple-self models and dual-system theories are aligned to 
provide better understanding of the causes of internal conflict, the terms “selves” and 
“systems” have much conceptual baggage. For instance, with regard to the status of 
selves in economics and decision theory, Elster remarked that:  
 
The conceptual strategies that have been used to make sense of this perplexing no-
tion differ in many ways; with respect to how literally the notion of ‘several selves’ 
is taken, with respect to the principles of partition, and with respect to the modes of 
interaction between the systems. (Elster, 1988, p. 1) 
 
This sentiment has since been echoed in debates in the philosophy of economics about 
the agency of persons who are internally divided. For instance, Ross (2005, 2010) and 
Davis (2003, 2011) have argued that individuals are collections of selves: these selves 
embody social and neural information relevant for making decisions and navigating 
the social world. Nevertheless, they disagree about how to interpret selves, and about 
what are the appropriate principles of partition (Grayot, 2017).  
Similarly, dual-process and dual-system theories have also received criticism. 
Evans, a pioneer of the dual-processing movement, has expressed doubts about 
whether human cognition fit into a two-system framework: 
 
                                                          
5 Though, alternative research by Glimcher et al. (2007) and Kable & Glimcher (2007) suggests 
that reward and information systems aren’t as discrete as dual-system theorists make them out 
to be. They argue that the processes involved in decision-making are so highly distributed 
throughout the brain that it is better to think of it as a unitary system (Rustichini, 2008; cf. 
Vromen, 2011). 
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Although it is striking that theorists in different areas have proposed dual systems 
with broadly similar characteristics, it is far from evident at present that a coherent 
theory based on two systems is possible. (Evans, 2006, p. 206) 
 
[And that] …my conclusion is that although dual-process theories enjoy good em-
pirical support in a number of fields in psychology, the superficially attractive no-
tion that they are related to the same underlying two systems of cognition is prob-
ably mistaken. (Evans, 2008, p. 271) 
 
Nevertheless, there have been a few notable attempts to organize developments in 
behavioral decision research. One instance of this is Alós-Ferrer & Strack (2014), who 
map out the theoretical connections between economics and psychology, namely, to 
show how dual-process models and dual-system theories have provided economics 
with a “theoretical scaffolding” to interpret human behavior in the context of individ-
ual decision-making (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014, p. 1). However, Alós-Ferrer & 
Strack’s overview serves better as a literature review than as a philosophical analysis. 
Their belief that behavioral economics and economic psychology are distinct disci-
plines—each developed for the respective needs and purposes of their parent disci-
plines—has so far blocked them from addressing deeper conceptual and ontological 
problems that relate to the integration of economic and psychological modeling meth-
ods. 
Two other instances are Rustichini (2008) and Brocas & Carrillo (2014). Unlike 
Alós-Ferrer & Strack, both Rustichini and Brocas & Carrillo explore how dual system 
theories have interfaced with neuroeconomics. I say “interfaced” for both seem com-
mitted to the view that the brain is a massively distributed optimizer, and that dual-
system theories merely help to understand its optimizing procedures. To this end, Rus-
tichini and Brocas & Carrillo endorse the same convention, namely, that “dual-system 
models” refer to information processing models, whereas “dual-self models” refer to 
intrapersonal bargaining models. Although these surveys get closer to the theme of 
this paper, neither of the authors defends this convention, which is to say, neither 
investigates how dual-process and dual-system models, as understood by social and 
cognitive psychology, might have been integrated with multiple-self models in eco-
nomics.  
To summarize, there are two senses in which MaMs are conceptually ambiguous. 
First, it is not established or easy to determine what the terms “selves” and “systems” 
refer to, either in economics or psychology. This is a well-known problem; though 
there is no easy solution. Second, once these terms are brought into close proximity—
via attempts at integration in MaMs—further conceptual ambiguity ensues. This es-
tablishes claim 1.  
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3. Agency and ontological ambiguity  
 
To recap, MaMs are not limited to any particular field of economics or decision re-
search: they are utilized by economists and psychologists alike. This explains, in part, 
why terms like “selves” and “systems” have taken such a wide array of meanings, 
some of which appear to be coextensive. But even correcting for possible conceptual 
ambiguities, there are further reasons to believe that MaMs may be ontologically am-
biguous. This has to do with the roles that selves and systems play as intrapersonal 
agents. 
 
3.1 The uncertain agency of selves and systems 
 
It’s important to remember that MaMs are constrained optimization models—they are 
constituted by decision agents that have limited resources. These agents are maximiz-
ers in the traditional economic sense. But, unlike standard multiple-self models, which 
conceive selves as virtual solutions to intrapersonal problems, MaMs rely (to varying 
degrees) on cognitive and neuroscientific evidence to derive motivations for the 
agents they posit. While these motivations are represented by utility functions like 
their virtual counterparts, the solutions are determined by information processes in the 
mind and/or brain. Hence, if one wants to understand how MaMs represent the in-
trapersonal (or intraneural) dynamics of decision-making, one needs to consider how 
selves and systems function as economic agents. To do this, however, we need to 
briefly talk about agency. 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an agent is “a being with 
the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capac-
ity” (Schlosser, 2015). Although this definition is not especially sophisticated, it is a 
useful point of departure for it calls into question whether economic agency is a spe-
cial kind of agency, and if so, whether it applies expressly to individual persons? One 
distillation of this question which continues to divide philosophers and methodolo-
gists of economics is whether rational choice models are intended to represent the 
cognitive capacities of human persons, or whether they’re intended to represent an 
instrumental account of action, one that abides by the rational norms of economic 
theory. Proponents of the former interpretation are inclined to think that the economic 
agent portrayed by rational choice models should map one-to-one onto the human 
person, which is to say, the economic agent is ontologically anchored to the individ-
ual. This is the common approach taken by behavioral economists and economic psy-
chologists. Proponents of the latter interpretation argue that economic agency is noth-
ing more than a reference point for the ascription of a utility function, and that, in 
principle, any entity can be modeled as an economic agent, so long as its behavior, as 
revealed by its preferences, is consistent.  
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The rift above can be attributed to unresolved debates concerning the normative 
and descriptive applications of the concept of economic agency—I will not review 
them here. Based on this summary, I posit a simple diagnostic that will aid in illus-
trating the problem of ontological ambiguity in MaMs:  
 
Economic agency implies human agency: It is common for researchers to equate the 
economic agent with the human person—for both normative and descriptive purposes, 
researchers regard human persons as prototypical decision agents. This can be, and 
often is, construed as a one-to-one ontological mapping between human person and 
economic agent as conceived by rational choice models.  
 
Economic agency implies instrumental rationality: Yet, there is no reason to restrict 
the concept of agency to humans. Not all economic models require a one-to-one on-
tological mapping to be mathematically valid or empirically sound. This is what ena-
bles economists to posit virtual agents, and to treat non-human entities as instrumen-
tally rational for purposes other than micro-economic evaluation.6 
 
The reason why we need to differentiate between kinds of economic agency is because 
it ceases to be clear what (or rather, where) is the locus of decision-making when 
individuals are partitioned into selves and/or systems. On the one hand, MaMs may 
provide solutions to intrapersonal problems that supervene on information processes. 
For instance, a person may experience conflict as a result of competing urges, and 
may seek to resolve this conflict by engaging in a bargaining game with temporal 
selves. We may interpret the bargaining procedure as the virtual embodiment of one 
cognitive system exerting control over another. On the other hand, MaMs may directly 
manifest informational conflict between functionally and/or structurally discrete sys-
tems. For instance, under the same scenario, what determines whether one system 
exerts control over another (and resolves intrapersonal conflict) depends on the avail-
ability of resources. We may interpret resource limitations as a form of intraneural 
conflict. Just as the former can be construed in game-theoretic form, so can the latter. 
The issue, however, is whether the same game-forms apply, and this depends on what 
selves and/or systems represent. Hence, in moving from one resolution to another, 
both conceptions of economic agency may come into play. 
As I will argue in section 4, it is because selves and systems occupy an uncertain 
ontological space that they can be harnessed for the expression of both personal and 
                                                          
6 One should bear in mind that these two conceptions of agency are for pedagogical purposes 
only. The questions about which researchers are divided far exceed merely normative and de-
scriptive applications of the concept of economic agency. For an analysis of the historical ori-
gins of these debates, see Ross (2005, 2010; cf. Davis, 2003, 2011); for further elaboration of 
Ross’ arguments, see Grayot (2017).   
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subpersonal instances of conflict, which in turn, supervene on both functional and 
structural properties of the mind and/or brain. Let’s now consider further how separate 
conceptions of agency generate ontological ambiguity. 
 
3.2 Two types of ontological ambiguity 
 
The benefit of teasing apart human agency and instrumental rationality is that it af-
fords room to speculate about who (or what) is the primary target of MaMs. This, I 
argue, constitutes an ontological problem. If economists and decision researchers seek 
to identify the causes of self-control problems and reasoning errors (and not merely 
predict when they occur) then it will be in their interest to know and discern which 
properties are relevant to first-person experiences of conflict versus those properties 
that are not. This is not merely a philosophical concern: given their wide conceptual 
latitude, selves and/or systems may take on properties that do not seem to fit with 
received scientific models of the mind and/or brain. I return to this point in section 5. 
To put the issue of ontological ambiguity into clearer perspective, consider two les-
sons from the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. 
 
Lesson 1: personal events are distinct from subpersonal events. Ontological ambigu-
ity can occur when mental entities are identified with physical entities. Mental entities 
refer to things like thoughts and sensations, whereas physical entities refer to things 
like brain activity and events in the nervous system. Even if physical entities could 
explain how mental entities occur (via supervenience relations), physical entities are 
not accessible to introspection, which mental entities are. Mental entities are thought 
to describe personal-level events, while physical entities describe subpersonal-level 
events. This is considered a philosophical problem because personal events and sub-
personal events describe different phenomena. (It follows that they require different 
kinds of evidence to be described as well, though this is a contested issue). The first 
form of ontological ambiguity (confusing the personal with the subpersonal) has been 
described by Dennett (1989, 1991; cf. Hornsby, 2000). 
 
Lesson 2: functional design may be separate from physical structure. Ontological am-
biguity can also occur when subpersonal-level events are not clearly delineated. For 
instance, events at the subpersonal level can be attributed to ‘functional design’ or to 
‘physical structure’. Functional design descriptions are, as the name suggests, func-
tional: they describe input-output relations. but do not necessarily describe physical 
behavior of biological mechanisms. This is considered a philosophical problem be-
cause descriptions based on functional-design may not accurately represent causal re-
lations, hierarchical organizations, etc. which descriptions at the physical-structural 
level are thought to represent. This second form of ontological ambiguity (confusing 
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functional design with physical structure) has been described by Marr (1982; cf. 
McClamrock, 1991).7  
 
The above problems characterize familiar problems in the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science. Agents are defined by their capacities to act, and because we are 
interested in knowing how selves and/or system interact, the generic cases above il-
lustrate nicely how descriptions of capacities relate to or give rise to ontological am-
biguity. In the next section I investigate how MaMs conceive of selves and/or systems 
as intra-personal agents, which means that I flesh out their capacities to (inter)act.  
 
4. Three examples of multi-agent models in behavioral decision research 
 
In the last section, I proposed two ways to think about the agency when individuals 
are partitioned into intrapersonal agents. In this section, I will defend my second 
claim, viz. that the uncertain status of selves and/or systems begets ontological ambi-
guity. This analysis is organized according to three questions: firstly, how are selves 
and/or systems conceived in each account; (2) how do selves and/or systems interact 
and represent internal conflict; (3) how does this dynamic lead to ontological ambi-
guity? 
 
4.1 A model of heuristic judgment (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005) 
 
The work of Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick draws inspiration from various 
sources in cognitive psychology (cf. Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gilbert, 
1999, 2002). Yet, their model of heuristic judgment relies heavily on a distinction 
drawn by Stanovich & West (2000). According to the latter, System 1 and System 2 
stand as labels for collections of cognitive processes that can be distinguished “by 
their speed, their controllability, and the contents on which they operate” (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2005, p. 268). The Kahneman & Frederick (2005) model, like its prede-
cessors (cf. Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003) seeks to understand how 
the interactions of System 1 and System 2 give rise to judgment errors, which result 
in unsound decisions. While the dual-system approach to human reasoning has gained 
considerable traction, I argue that Kahneman & Frederick’s particular model does a 
                                                          
7 Dennett (1989) distinguishes three levels of abstraction—called “stances”—by which to un-
derstand human behavior. The physical stance understands behavior in terms of physiological 
processes; the design stance understands behavior in terms of a system’s purposes; and the 
intentional stance understands behavior in terms of mentalistic, or folk-psychological explana-
tions. Similarly, Marr (1982) distinguishes three ways of characterizing information processing. 
The most basic level is the biological level, or implementation level; this is followed by the 
algorithmic level, which pertains to functional descriptions; and lastly is the computational 
level, which describes the programs run by information systems. 
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poor job of characterizing the interaction of Systems 1 and 2. Their portrayal of the 
activation of cognitive and affective processes which correspond to these systems is 
not adequate to understand how conflict between systems leads to decision problems. 
In the Kahneman & Frederick (2005) model, the heuristics of accessibility and 
representativeness reflect the rapid, automatic, and effortless nature of the processes 
of System 1. Accessibility refers to the means or ability of an individual to retrieve 
information. As a decision heuristic, it highlights the ease or naturalness with which 
the mind registers content and attributes of objects of choice—it is thus associated 
with memory-based judgments where frequency of experiences determines the likeli-
hood of accessing relevant information. For instance, accessibility may explain how 
individuals quickly identify outliers in a group of physically similar objects without 
the aid of a measurement tool or guidance of a rule. Likewise, it may also explain how 
individuals respond to emotionally charged language or repulsive images before they 
consciously register them. Such responses are useful for avoiding danger and for mak-
ing rapid judgments. However, when a task is too complex to be immediately com-
prehended, lack of accessibility may lead one to substitute-in information. “Attribute 
substitution” is the heuristic process by which individuals simplify a task or choice 
dilemma through retrieval of information that is present in mind; it typically involves 
replacing the key attributes of an object or proposition with attributes of another, more 
familiar object. Kahneman & Frederick (2005, pp. 269-74) argue that many of the 
systematic biases uncovered by previous research into static choice violations are due 
to attribute substitution.  
Prima facie, Kahneman and Frederick's dual-system approach is not integrative 
in the same way that other behavioral economic and neuroeconomic accounts are. Yet, 
their model is predicated on a divided self, which interprets individual behavior as the 
outcome of the interaction of System 1 and System 2. Kahneman & Frederick endorse 
what is known as the “default-interventionist” model of dual-system theory, which 
posits that System 1 and System 2 are arranged sequentially. Under this view, System 
1 and its concomitant processes are activated by default—the individual has no control 
over initial responses to external stimuli. System 2 is thought to intervene on System 
1 when it detects errors in judgment. This is what allows it to subdue some impulsive 
behaviors. They describe this dynamic as follows:  
 
In the particular dual-process model we assume, system 1 quickly proposes intui-
tive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and system 2 monitors the quality 
of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override… We assume system 
1 and system 2 can be active concurrently, that automatic and controlled cognitive 
operations compete for the control of overt responses, and that deliberate judgments 
are likely to remain anchored on initial impressions. (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, 
p. 267) 
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However, an unresolved problem with this model is that it is underdetermined how 
System 1 and System 2 interact—or rather, that it is unclear what it means to say that 
they “interact”. Kahneman & Frederick claim that the “effect of concurrent cognitive 
tasks provides the most useful indication of whether a given mental process belongs 
to system 1 or system 2” and further, that, “Because the overall capacity for mental 
effort is limited, effortful processes tend to disrupt each other, whereas effortless pro-
cesses neither cause nor suffer much interference when combined with other tasks…” 
(2005, p. 268). Accordingly, they interpret the monitoring function of system 2 to be 
dependent on the effort required to inhibit System 1. Thus, in order for System 2 to 
monitor and override System 1, it must have the resources to do so. But it is unclear 
whether resources refer to functional capacities (e.g., alertness or willpower) or 
whether they refer to physiological resources (e.g., GABA and dopamine). Kahneman 
& Frederick defer to the neurosciences to flesh this out—but this merely sidesteps the 
issue. In supposing that System 2 has some limited control over the automatic and 
unconscious processes of System 1, System 2 would, in some sense, have to constitute 
System 1. It is, in fact, a common criticism of system-based interpretations of dual-
process theory that cognitive systems cannot be construed as discrete since many pro-
cesses operate on a continuum. Kahneman & Frederick caution readers not to think of 
systems as “autonomous homunculi”, and clarify that the term “system” is merely a 
“label for collections of cognitive processes that can be distinguished by their speed, 
their controllability, and the contents on which they operate” (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2005, p. 267).  But this simply begs the question—their account must presuppose that 
System 1 and System 2 have the functional characteristics they do because cognitive 
processes operate on a continuum.8  
The issue that arises here is that, without a clearer understanding of how System 
1 and System 2 operate and interact, it becomes uncertain what, exactly, Kahneman 
& Frederick’s model of heuristic judgment tells us about the intrapersonal dynamics 
of decision-making (aside from the obvious fact that people sometimes lack the focus 
or training to avoid biases in judgment). In focusing on the functional characteristics 
of System 1 and System 2, their account straddles an ontological divide which requires 
System 2 perform both personal-level and subpersonal-level functions. On the one 
hand, System 2 is responsible for capacities which support conscious control, reflec-
tion, and rational deliberation—things we attribute to persons; but, on the other hand, 
System 2 must frequently perform subpersonal-level tasks which allow it to function 
                                                          
8 Although most proponents of the System 1 / System 2 distinction endorse the “default-inter-
ventionist” model, it is not agreed what the appropriate neuroanatomical correlates of System 
1 and System 2 are, or would be, and for this reason the story of their interaction is mired in 
theoretical disputes about the functional design dual-system models (cf. Osman, 2004; Keren 
& Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2009; Keren, 2013; Mugg, 2016). Furthermore, there 
isn’t sufficient empirical evidence to validate either the default-interventionist or the parallel-
competitive interpretation of system interaction. (Sinayev, 2016; Pennycook, 2017).  
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as monitor of System 1. What this means is that the Kahneman & Frederick model is 
ambiguous with regard to the personal–subpersonal ontological distinction. So, alt-
hough there is no intrinsic problem with how they conceive of System 1 (it is solely 
and unambiguously comprised of subpersonal processes), there is a problem with how 
they conceive of System 2. I return to discuss implications for this ontological ambi-
guity in section 5. 
 
4.2 The brain as hierarchical organization (Brocas & Carrillo, 2008a) 
 
Brocas & Carrillo’s (2008a) neuroeconomic framework is predicated on a modular 
interpretation of the brain. This means that they take different systems in the brain to 
literally compute or process information in line with some biological function. To this 
end, each biological function requires the intervention of several other systems, whose 
network connections impose constraints on the availability of energy. Insofar as these 
modules can be interpreted as having independent goals, Brocas & Carrillo (2008a) 
argue that the brain can be modeled as an organization of hierarchical systems, in 
which the hierarchy is determined by the flow of information between regions of the 
“reflective” system and “impulsive” system. Thus, their framework derives several 
models, each of which purports to show how conflict between brain systems gives rise 
to time preferences and related decision errors. I argue, however, that the notion of 
physiological conflict is contentious in Brocas & Carrillo’s (2008a) framework. It is 
often not clear what is the resolution, or level, at which conflict occurs and at which 
information is constrained.  
In their (2008a) publication, Brocas & Carrillo present three ways that conflict in 
the brain gives rise to decision errors. For the sake of space, I will concentrate on what 
they call information asymmetry. Information asymmetry, as the name suggests, re-
fers to physiological constraints on information flow between brain regions. The flow 
is determined to be asymmetrical precisely because neural connectivity is a limited 
resource and most brain areas are unidirectionally linked to others. This results in 
limited awareness of individuals’ motivations for their decisions (2008a, p. 1315).9   
With regard to modeling physiological conflict, Brocas & Carrillo adopt several 
principal-agent configurations to represent the interaction of systems in the brain. 
Each configuration corresponds to a different cognitive operation. For illustrative pur-
poses, let’s consider a sample model that formally represents the interactions of the 
impulsive system and the reflective system in the brain. Space constraints prohibit me 
from giving full attention to the formal results provided in (Brocas & Carrillo, 2008a) 
which distinguish consumption and labor behavior under full information and 
                                                          
9 The other two forms of conflict are temporal horizon and incentive salience. Here I concen-
trate specifically on information asymmetry for it is crucial for understanding the physiological 
basis of their endogenous discounting model.  
62 
 
 
imperfect information. This discussion is limited to the basic formal exposition pro-
vided in (Brocas & Carrillo, 2008b).   
Suppose an individual lives an infinite number of periods t ∈ {1, 2,…T}; she 
works 𝑛𝑡 ∈  [0, ?̅?] and consumes 𝑐𝑡 ≥ 0. Each unit of labor worked entails that the 
individual has an additional unit to spend. The individual is thus divided into separate 
systems: the agent (which corresponds to the impulsive system) is myopic and in-
formed, i.e. it ‘knows’ the relative desirability of a consumption package. It’s prefer-
ences at t are depicted as  
 
𝑈𝑡 =  𝜃𝑡𝑢(𝑐𝑡) −  𝑛𝑡  
 
where u' > 0 and u'' < 0. 𝜃t is privately known and represents the marginal value of 
consumption at time t. Likewise, the principal, (which corresponds to the reflective 
system) is forward-looking and uninformed, i.e. it does not ‘know’ the value of 𝜃,. 
The principal weighs the utility of all agents under a budget constraint that links life-
time consumption and lifetime labor 
 
𝑆 =  ∑ 𝐸 [𝜃𝑡𝑢(𝑐𝑡) −  𝑛𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
where S captures the intertemporal utility of the principal from the perspective of t.  
The first caveat of this formulation is this that if the principal knew 𝜃t the ‘exist-
ence’ of agents would be irrelevant. Thus, presuming informational asymmetry, the 
principal at each date proposes a menu of incentive compatible pairs to the agent: 
 
{𝑐𝑡(𝜃𝑡), 𝑛𝑡(𝜃𝑡)}𝜃𝑡 ∈ [𝜃,𝜃] 
 
Where 𝑐𝑡(𝜃𝑡) denotes a consumption package and 𝑛𝑡(𝜃𝑡) denotes the labor the agent 
is incentivized to work if she wishes to consume it (this is comparable to a contract 
with hidden information).  
Brocas & Carrillo determine that the optimal strategy for the principal, given that 
she does not know the private value of 𝜃𝑡, is to restrict the agent’s choices at each 
period so as to maximize her own utility. This result gives rise to a self-disciplining 
rule of “work more today to consume today” (2008a, 4). This allows agents (i.e. re-
gions of the brain that make up the impulsive system) to pursue immediate rewards 
within the restrictions set by the principal (i.e. regions of the brain that make up re-
flective system). In essence, this configuration portrays a precommitment technology 
set by the reflective system. 
63 
 
 
It’s important to keep in mind that this formulation—i.e. the interaction of agent 
and principal—are representations of neural activity that is not accessible to the indi-
vidual by introspection. Thus, when Brocas & Carrillo claim that the principal does 
not “know” the value of 𝜃𝑡, what they actually mean is that neural network connec-
tions do not allow the reflective system to receive information; information reaches 
the impulsive system sooner than the reflective system can monitor it. According to 
Brocas & Carrillo, the reflective system prohibits the impulsive system from seeking 
immediate gratification by regulating the information it receives. By analogy, the prin-
ciple ensures that what the agent consumes is within a menu of the principal’s choos-
ing. But this is not very illuminating given that everything a brain does depends on 
the flow of information. 
To recap, Brocas & Carrillo use the terms “reflective system” and “impulsive 
system” to identify regions of the brain that process information relevant to the 
achievement of different cognitive functions. (The impulsive system is analogous to 
System 1 processes, whereas the reflective system is analogous to System 2 pro-
cesses). The principal-agent model depicts a formal relationship, one which is based 
on the principal having imperfect information. In reality, this relationship is not based 
on imperfect information but on asymmetrical information, which incurs intraneural 
conflict. But this raises an important question, which is whether the principal-agent 
model depicts one system (“the automatic system”, comprising both reward prediction 
and motor preparation for consumption), within which information flow is disrupted, 
or two systems (a “reward system” and a “motor preparation system”) between which 
information delivery is prevented. Brocas & Carrillo do not seem to be very concerned 
with the distinction, as they are more interested to show that economic theory can be 
useful for understanding how the brain acts like an optimizer:  
 
The methodology used in neuroeconomic theory is in fact quite close to the meth-
odology economists rely on to represent the choices of an individual assuming he 
is a coherent entity. We are simply taking one step back: the coherent unit is not 
the individual but rather the cells (and perhaps the systems) that compose him” 
(2008b, p. 46). 
 
However, the clause “and perhaps the systems” turns out to be an important bit of 
information that could drastically change how their model is interpreted. Because of 
precisely this, it is uncertain whether intraneural conflict occurs at the level of systems 
or at the level of cells.10 Given their conception of systems as brain regions, the former 
                                                          
10 Compare this with the following claim: “In our ‘as if’ methodology, each system wants to 
pass reliable information given its objective. However, this information may contradict the in-
formation passed by a different system. A third system may then inhibit the activity of one of 
the systems to distort the decision in favor of the other. Overall, behavior can be represented as 
the result of an interplay between systems with different objectives, and the particular nature of 
the interaction will vary across decision problems” (Brocas & Carrillo, 2014, p. 47). 
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would constitute an understanding of optimization based on the brain’s functional de-
sign, whereas the latter would constitute and understanding of optimization that is 
based on its physical structure. Because they waver between the two, this indicates 
that Brocas and Carrillo’s neuroeconomic framework is ontologically ambiguous. I 
return to this point in section 5.3, where I show how this ontological ambiguity leads 
to explanatory problems.  
 
4.3 Deliberative vs. affective systems (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2005) 
 
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue’s account can be read as an attempt to generalize results 
obtained by other intertemporal dual-self models. In particular, their model interprets 
differently motivated selves based on the functions of the “affective” and “delibera-
tive” systems (these are analogous to System 1 and System 2). When an individual 
makes a choice, the interaction of the affective and deliberative systems result is a 
tradeoff—or ‘effort cost’. The effort cost expresses an individual’s ‘quantity’ of will 
power, which dictates their self-control. However, what will power is, and how it in-
forms their conception of an effort cost creates ambiguity about the very idea of con-
flict. I will argue that these ambiguities arise because Loewenstein & O’Donoghue do 
not clearly establish the roles of systems as intrapersonal agents.  
When an agent makes a choice, x (within some set of choices, xX), the interac-
tion of the affective and deliberative systems results in a tradeoff—what they call an 
‘effort cost’—between the affective optimum, which describes the ‘choice’ the affec-
tive system would make free of influence from the deliberative system, and the delib-
erative optimum, which describes the ‘choice’ the deliberative system would make 
free of any influence from the affective system. The affective optimum is represented 
xA  arg maxxX M(x,a), where M(x,a) is the motivational function which captures the 
affective system’s desire for x. The deliberative optimum is represented as xD  arg 
maxxX U(x), where U(x) is the utility of the deliberative system’s choice. The inter-
action between the two systems is thus represented:  
 
𝑉(𝑥) ≡ 𝑈(𝑥) − ℎ(𝑊, 𝜎) ∗ [𝑀(𝑥𝐴, 𝑎) − 𝑀(𝑥, 𝑎)] 
 
where h(W,) *[M(xA,a) – M(x,a)] represents the cognitive effort exerted by the de-
liberative system over the affective system (with h (W,) representing the cost to mo-
bilize willpower). In short, the value function computes the deliberative optimum, 
measured in utility, minus the effort it takes to regulate the affective system. Loewen-
stein & O’Donoghue claim that this model captures the effort cost it takes for a person 
to exert control over their impulses.  
Notice, however, that valuation for the deliberative system is measured as a func-
tion of utility, whereas valuation for the affective system is measured as a function of 
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motivation. The motivation function (captured by the affective optimum xA) is taken 
to be exogenous to the deliberative system’s utility function—presumably, this is be-
cause the processes associated with the affective system are activated by parts of the 
brain that are inaccessible to introspection (2005, p. 3). This could be read as an indi-
cation of their ontological stance regarding the target and explanatory aim of their 
model—viz. that it seeks to explain individual-level behavior through the effects of 
sub-personal processing.  
To illustrate this point, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue describe how the delibera-
tive system values a single choice with an outcome spread over time—i.e. an action x 
has an immediate pay-off z1(x) and a future pay-off z2(x). The affective system, being 
myopic and driven to consume immediately, has a motivational function M(x) = z1(x), 
whereas the deliberative system, which values both immediate and future rewards, has 
a utility function U(x) = z1(x) + z2(x). A choice which maximizes x given both values 
can be represented as:  
 
𝑉(𝑥) =  [𝑧1(𝑥)  + 𝑧2(𝑥) ] − ℎ
∗[𝑧1(𝑥
𝐴) − 𝑧1(𝑥)] 
 
where the inclusive value of z1(x) and z2(x) are diminished by the effort cost to regulate 
the affective system. Given that the affective optimum is exogenous, the pay-off z1(x) 
effectively tips the weighted sum of the two pay-offs toward the immediate reward. 
This, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue argue, is equivalent to maximizing  
 
?̃?(𝑥) =  𝑧1(𝑥) − [1 (1 + ℎ)⁄ ]*𝑧2(𝑥) 
 
which depicts a natural discounting function. In this reformulation, [1 (1 + ℎ)⁄ ] < 1 
indicates that the deliberative system will devalue future pay-offs, not because it has 
time preferences of its own, but because the joint attention toward immediate rewards 
by both systems will outweigh any interest the deliberative system has for separate 
future pay-offs.  
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue seem to commit the same initial error as Kahneman 
& Frederick, viz. they attribute higher cognitive functions to the deliberative system, 
while portraying the affective system as a collection of automatic processes. Their 
justification for this is twofold: Firstly, given that the deliberative system is associated 
with the operations of the prefrontal cortex, only the deliberative system is capable of 
making decisions. This explains why, by contrast, they refer to the affective system’s 
optimum as a motivation function, not as a utility function. However, unlike Kahne-
man & Frederick (but like Brocas & Carrillo), Loewenstein & O’Donoghue portray 
the interaction of systems by way of a principal-agent formalism, not by explicit de-
scriptions of either functional or physiological processes. The methodology for de-
picting this interaction, whereby the principal trades off its own utility to restrict the 
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choices of the agent, obscures what intrapersonal conflict is and how cognitive control 
is achieved. This is partly due to the fact that the concept of a system is left open-
ended. The claim, “We refer to the two processes as ‘systems’ simply to underline the 
fact that they can generate divergent motivations, not to suggest that they are operate 
independently or are physiologically distinct” (2005, p. 9). But this admission doesn’t 
help their cause. Even if Loewenstein & O’Donoghue contended that their under-
standing of systems is purely functional, they still abuse the concept of a higher cog-
nitive system by expecting it to do all sorts of things that persons could not con-
sciously do, i.e., monitor processes of the affective system, calculate the utility costs 
to exert control. Like, Kahneman & Frederick, the ontological status of the delibera-
tive system is ambiguous; and this status is only exacerbated by the fact that they 
introduce willpower as its primary cognitive resource. So, not only is Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue’s model ignorant of how the deliberative system and affective system 
interact physiologically, but it is ontologically ambiguous with regard to intrapersonal 
conflict because it involves both personal-level and subpersonal-level events.  
 
5. Implications for scientific understanding  
 
In the introduction of the paper I presented three claims: The first claim is that selves 
and systems are ambiguous concepts. The second claim is that MaMs can be ontolog-
ically ambiguous. However, it could be argued that these are philosophical problems 
that have limited scientific import. This leads to this paper’s third and final claim, viz. 
that decision researchers should take conceptual and ontological ambiguity seriously 
because they possibly undermine scientific understanding.  
In support of this claim, I argue that MaMs may lack explanatory power, and this 
undermines their scientific value. To demonstrate this, I will revisit the cases above. 
My inquiry is organized around two questions: What does the model purport to ex-
plain? and How does the model achieve this goal? In each case, there is a disruption 
between the purported aim and the means to achieve that aim. I attribute this disrup-
tion to the fact that each of the above MaMs fails to define its explanandum. 
 
5.1 What does the model purport to explain? 
 
Recall that each MaM discussed above purports to understand how different decision 
errors arise, and in some instances, this is used to make sense of self-control problems. 
To recap, here is how each MaM pursues this goal.  
Kahneman & Frederick’s model of heuristic judgment is designed to show how 
the functioning of System 1 and System 2 relate to various reasoning techniques, 
called heuristics, and failures of reasoning by way of biases. The goal of the model is 
to provide a map which identifies different causes of reasoning errors, those which 
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provoke System 1 into action, and those which prevent System 2 to override System 
1. Their explanation of how this happens amounts to a description of the conditions 
which can lead System 2 to fail to ‘intervene’ and stop System 1 from carrying out 
irrational behaviors.  
Brocas & Carrillo’s model, the brain as hierarchical organization, seeks to iden-
tify an endogenous discounting function in the brain which explains how individuals 
reverse preferences. Their goal is to utilize neuroscientific insights about information 
asymmetries in the brain to explain how intraneural conflict arises, and how it leads 
to decision errors. Their explanation is based on a model of the brain which views 
neural systems in a hierarchical relation to one another, which can be depicted as if 
they are utility optimizers. 
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue’s model of deliberative and affective systems tries 
to provide a generalized decision model which demonstrates how the deliberative sys-
tem ‘decides’ to intervene on the affective system. Unlike Kahneman & Frederick’s 
dual-system approach, they attempt to quantify the effort it takes the deliberative sys-
tem to override the impulses of the affective system. This primary aim of their model 
is to improve both the predictive and explanatory power of dual-self models which 
utilize both psychological and neuroscientific evidence.  
Having stated the purported scientific goals of each model, we can now consider 
the second question, “how does the model achieve its goal?” Below I answer this 
‘how’ question by demonstrating that MaMs are not sufficiently explanatory. 
 
5.2 How does the model achieve this goal?  
 
A model of heuristic judgment. Because Kahneman & Frederick’s scientific goals are 
modest compared with the other two, their problems are simpler. In short, Kahneman 
& Frederick do not adequately explain how System 1 and System 2 interact. To reit-
erate section 4.1, I consider how System 1 and System 2 function as intrapersonal 
agents. System 1 is the default system, which means that its capacities are not acces-
sible to introspection, whereas System 2 is the intervening system, which means that 
it monitors system 1 to prohibit rapid judgments from implementing bad decisions. 
But, System 2 also is described as a “rational” system, one which is involved in careful 
deliberations. For this reason, it’s not clear whether System 1 and System 2 are really 
separate entities. This ontological ambiguity is at the heart of the some important—
and well documented—explanatory problems.11 For instance, Kahneman and Freder-
ick can’t explain how the ‘monitoring’ and ‘intervening’ operations of System 2 upon 
System 1 actually work. In fact, rather it seems that these descriptions are metaphori-
cal, not scientific (which Kahneman has alluded to elsewhere, cf. 2011).  
                                                          
11 See, e.g., Osman (2004); Keren & Schul (2009); Kruglanski & Gigerenzer (2009); Keren 
(2013); Mugg (2016). 
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There is a litany of reasons to question the System 1 / System 2 distinction. How-
ever, to be charitable to the scientific aims of Kahneman & Frederick’s model, we 
should evaluate it on whether it achieves its purported aim to explain how System 1 
and System 2 relate to reasoning errors. To this end, the model works perhaps as a 
loose framework. But as an explanatory model for the purposes of understanding how 
decisions are made, it is insufficient. 
 
The brain as hierarchical organization. B&C believe that the asymmetric flow of in-
formation between systems in the brain is the cause of some reasoning errors. Yet, it’s 
difficult to tell whether this flow of information constitutes a causal relationship or a 
merely functional one, which they flesh out with formal optimization models. It is 
quite uncertain whether their goal is to explain what brains actually do or to justify 
the use of optimization models to organize brain functions. This lack of a clear ex-
planatory target seems to follow from the ontological ambiguities discussed above.  
Because their model focuses on the brain (and not the individual), it was estab-
lished that their model conflates the functional characteristics of systems with their 
neural signaling pathways. This gives the impression that there is more going on in 
the brain than two systems competing for energy resources. It suggests that there may 
be multiple systems with varying degrees of control over the flow of information, with 
some central mechanism governing the flow of energy resources in a strategically 
optimal way. In fact, Brocas & Carrillo cite evidence for the existence of a central 
resource allocation system, which they posit as a candidate for a third system (cf. 
Brocas & Carrillo, 2014).12 But if this is the case, then we encounter a tension between 
the functional characteristics of the reflective and impulsive systems wherein it is un-
certain how conflict arises, and the physical structure of these systems, which are un-
derstood as distributed regions of neural networks whose functions vary according to 
features of the individual’s choice environment.  
Though, one may be inclined to think that there is no ontological ambiguity here 
since, even though Brocas & Carrillo believe that the “systems” to which they refer 
are neural signaling pathways, it’s unproblematic to read them also as providing a 
functional conceptualization of systems. I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning. 
But, if one interprets them as providing an economic interpretation of the functional 
characteristics of neural signaling pathways, it’s then unclear whether these charac-
teristics are artifacts of the principal-agent model (and other economic formalisms 
which they use), or whether they identify functions unique to the brain’s physical 
structure (as opposed to brain functions that are incidentally picked out by their 
                                                          
12 They state, “some areas of the lateral prefrontal cortex play an active role when attention is 
divided, for instance when two tasks have to be completed at the same time. This points to the 
existence of what has been called a ‘Central Executive System’ whose role is to coordinate the 
systems involved in the different tasks” (2014, p. 50). 
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model). Hence, If Brocas & Carrillo’s justification for adopting the neuroeconomic 
approach is that it provides a descriptively superior model of optimization procedures 
as they occur in the brain, then we should not expect there to be ambiguity about the 
how functional characteristics supervene on the brain—otherwise why adopt the ‘as-
if’ approach in the first place? Why not stick to the conventional methods of functional 
neuroscience?  
In sum, while Brocas & Carrillo may provide sophisticated and explicit descrip-
tions of the antecedents of physiological conflict, it’s not certain what they intend to 
explain. The ontological tensions between their interpretation of the functional design 
and physical structure of neural signaling pathways in the brain can be seen as a down-
stream effect of their failure to define where intraneural conflict arises within systems.   
 
Deliberative vs. affective systems. In section 4.3, I argued that Loewenstein & O’Do-
noghue’s model is ontologically ambiguous in two ways: firstly, it wavers between 
the personal and sub-personal level in its portrayal of intrapersonal conflict. Secondly, 
it invokes both functional-design and physical-structure descriptions to justify the use 
of a principal-agent model, though it does not carefully distinguish these. We can ex-
tract two explanatory problems from these ambiguities.  
Recall that the deliberative system is thought to ‘calculate’ an effort cost which 
is based on some quantity of will power. They closest thing to a non-metaphorical 
explanation they give is a quick and conceptually vague description of will power (cf. 
Baumeister & Vohs, 2003). They liken will power to an energy source which the de-
liberative system needs to perform its function. But our question is, how does will 
power inform their conception of intrapersonal conflict? How does the deliberative 
system ‘monitor’ and ‘intervene’ upon the affective system? Like Kahneman & Fred-
erick, the interaction between systems is explained away as a topic for the neurosci-
entist. Even if we were to grant this, the question about how will power relates to 
cognitive effort, and how this is ‘calculated’ by the deliberative system, is left unex-
plained. By substituting descriptions of physiological processes (which waver be-
tween functional design descriptions and physical structural descriptions) with opti-
mization models, the inter-system dynamic is effectively relegated to a black box. 
This, rather than improving explanatory power, diminishes it. Ultimately, it is unclear 
what Loewenstein & O’Donoghue think intrapersonal conflict consists in, or how it 
is generated.  
 
5.3 Rebuttals and reconsiderations 
 
One could argue that this paper’s diagnosis of MaMs betrays a conservatism that is, 
in reality, not very interesting to the cognitive or behavioral scientist, and that my 
emphasis on ontological ambiguity relies too much on a philosophically nuanced 
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critique of functional explanations. I would like to address this concern by contrasting 
the above accounts with a family of models from functional neuroscience that do not 
share these problems. The study of addiction is an apt example here as it coincides 
with this paper’s theme on reasoning errors and self-control problems.  
There is increasing evidence to suggest that the neurochemical basis of addiction 
lies in the human midbrain (striatial / dopamine circuit) is relatively autonomous from 
frontal systems (orbitofrontal and pre-frontal cortex), which are typically associated 
with executive functioning and cognitive control. the striatum, which projects from 
the midbrain, can be treated as if it were external to the agent because its valuations 
of attention and motor cuing occur prior to the activation of frontal systems. an eco-
nomic model can then represent a striatum that has learned to consume addictively as 
imposing an exogenous cost on the agent’s efforts to optimize, and the agent remains 
unambiguously virtual and functional (much like the account discussed in section 4). 
As argued in Ross (2012), “such models provide algorithms by which the reward sys-
tem is taken to estimate the expected opportunity costs of attending to one stimulus 
rather than another and of preparing one motor response rather than another” (p. 719; 
cf. Montague & Berns, 2002; Ross, 2008). Hence, what has led behavioral economists 
and neuroeconomists discussed in this paper get into trouble is that they address, by 
way of functional models, intracortical processes for which neurochemical specifica-
tions are not yet in hand.   
The economic models are thus, in part, speculations about intracortical mecha-
nisms. But, the reason that functional and neurochemical models of addiction cohabit 
comfortably in some neuroeconomic models (i.e. “neurocellular economics”—Ross, 
2008) is they don’t confuse functional characteristics of intracortical agents with in-
terpersonal conflict. This is, in summation, why the dual-system and dual-self models 
of behavioral economists tend to fall into ontological ambiguity. Whether an account 
like Brocas & Carrillo’s dodges this general critique is hard to say because they are 
far less concise in their depiction of the functional characteristics of neural signaling 
pathways.   
This consideration heeds another possible rebuttal, which is whether MaMs really 
are about intrapersonal and/or intraneural conflict? It could be argued that perhaps I 
am putting too much stock in the notion of conflict, or that I (wrongly) interpret MaMs 
to be solely about this issue. Admittedly, the paper uses the metaphor of the divided 
self as way of motivating my diagnosis of MaMs, so I do, in a sense, presuppose that 
which I analyze. However, even if the accounts I cite are not interested in conflict per 
se, the act of partitioning individuals into intrapersonal and intraneural agents—
whether construed as selves or systems (or both)—suggests that reasoning errors arise 
due to complicated internal dynamics.  
It could be argued that I am trying to make comparisons among models that are 
not so easily comparable. Along these same lines, it could be argued that my concept 
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of MaM is too generic, that it gives the wrong impression about what each model tries 
to explain relative to the others. I have two responses:  
First, the issue of comparability is important. The reason for investigating MaMs 
is that there is not enough information about models that synthesize or integrate eco-
nomics and psychology, especially with regard to models that partition individuals 
into simpler agents. The few authors that have attempted to review this literature, who 
I discussed in section 2, came up short of the goal I seek here. What I provide is a 
philosophically precise analysis that links reasoning errors to internal conflict, which 
so far has been sorely missing from the decision research literature.  
Second, the issue of comparability unmasks an inherent challenge to writing this 
paper. One cannot, it seems, embark on such a complicated analysis without also get-
ting tangled in debates about interdisciplinarity and integration. These are, without a 
doubt, important debates – especially as it pertains to the long and complicated histo-
ries of economics and psychology. Yet, these are different debates. My interest here 
is not in dictating which discipline should hold ownership of MaMs, but in bypassing 
this question. Behavioral decision researchers are not historians of science and do not 
make modeling decisions on the basis of their disciplinary loyalty. While the case 
could be made that economists borrow more from psychologists, it would put the cart 
before the horse to claim that MaMs are just instances of behavioral economic mod-
eling. The question I have pursued in this paper is how to make sense of models that 
posit selves and systems as intrapersonal and intraneural agents, and my response was 
to compare and contrast three unique cases which utilize these concepts in similar but 
subtly different ways. It is because there are no meta-theoretic rules dictating which 
methods researchers can use that we need a wider purview to begin analyzing the 
different ways economics and psychology have been integrated. This, it seems to me, 
should come before we set limitations on the concept of integration.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
While the divided mind is familiar metaphor, this paper argues that how researchers 
conceptualize and implement this idea with formal models and theoretical language 
has led to confusion about how to represent the intrapersonal dynamics of decision-
making. Although multi-agent models would seem to be a boon for interdisciplinary 
decision research, the rapid integration of multiple-self modeling techniques with 
dual-system theories has led to confusion about what, exactly, causes internal conflict. 
Attempts at integration have shown researchers assimilating dynamical processes that 
are not only conceptually quite different, but also involves crossing ontological 
boundaries. I discussed three instances of this, from economic psychology, behavioral 
economics, and neuroeconomics. I concluded from this investigation that conceptual 
and ontological ambiguities are not merely philosophical problems. They are 
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scientific problems, insofar as decision researchers desire to explain how reasoning 
errors and self-control problems are generated by intrapersonal or intraneural conflict. 
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Chapter 5 
Why behavioral economics needs to revise  
its faith in dual process theories 
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Chapter 6 
Looking back and looking ahead… 
 
 
1. Looking back 
 
In economics, agency and choice are concepts that are inextricably linked. Agents 
make choices, and choices represent agents’ preferences. One concept cannot persist 
without the other. Hence, in recognizing that individuals are boundedly rational, in-
deed even boundedly individual, economists and behavioral decision researchers who 
use rational choice theory have been faced with a decision: either ignore anomalies 
produced by decades of experimental research and interdisciplinary collaboration and 
continue on with the standard tools and operative concepts of orthodox economics; 
or, address anomalies and revise those tools and operative concepts. The literature on 
philosophy and methodology of economics, as well as on behavioral economics and 
behavioral decision research indicates that economists are divided over how to pro-
ceed.  
Chapters 2 – 5 project two main approaches to reconciling the tension between 
agency and choice. One approach views individual persons as the primary objects of 
study for economics, and as such, look to psychology and the neurosciences to identify 
more appropriate loci for the study of choice (either in the brain, or within functional 
structures that support decision-making). The other approach views individual per-
sons not as the primary object of study (economic agents are the primary objects, and 
they are ontologically distinct from persons given that they are purely theoretical en-
tities). As such, choice should be construed as the outcome of external pressures like 
markets, institutions, and social norms, which impart constraints as well as socio-cog-
nitive support. So where does one go from here? My intuition is to follow the trajec-
tory of the two approaches down separate paths.  
 
2. Looking ahead 
 
Let’s suppose that behavioral economists wish to achieve greater descriptive power 
concerning models of the internal dynamics of decision-making (perhaps they don’t—
but suppose they do), it seems that they have two options: option 1 is they can wait to 
see what comes of the on-going debates between behavioral economics in the scanner 
and economics of neural activity approaches in neuroeconomics. This could prove 
promising given that the fields do seem to be converging in unexpected ways 
(Vromen, 2011). But it could be argued that the convergence of neuroeconomic ap-
proaches is bringing more rather than less complexity concerning where and how de-
cisions are made, and choices executed (Fumagalli, 2011, 2016). This mixture of 
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added complexity and lack of clear limitations about explanatory benefits of neuroe-
conomics may not be appealing to behavioral economists who were not already com-
mitted to the neural enhancement of economics models. Thus, Option 2:  
Below are two alternative psychological frameworks which provide some relief 
from the theoretical and empirical inadequacies of dual process theory while also of-
fering novel ways to predict and explain decision phenomena. 
Alternative 1: “Decision field theory” (cf. Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004, 2008) is 
a computational model of decision making which uses a connectionist, neural network 
framework to represent preference formation. Rather than represent decisions as a de-
terministic set of cognitive processes, decision field theory represents choice options 
via a network of actions with interconnected property nodes; the value of a given ac-
tion is affected by the attention weight which links an action to a given property. At-
tention weights are influenced by background beliefs and information, but are inher-
ently stochastic. A preference state is achieved when the accumulation of attention 
weights reaches a threshold and induces an action.  
The primary benefit of computational models of cognition such as decision field 
theory is that offer a legitimately computational basis for human learning and infer-
ence by way of mathematical modeling and computer simulation (and, of course, be-
havioral experiments). When applied to the study of decision making, such models 
provide a means of tracking utility optimization procedures in a way that can track 
preference formation. This would constitute a more realistic interpretation of the in-
formation processing metaphor that behavioral economists use.   
The limitation of such a model is that it’s not evident how individuals’ mental 
states mediate the distribution of attentional weights to actions when decision field 
theory is interpreted as an artificial neural network—in this way, it is comparable to 
functionalist accounts of dual process theory which black-boxes processes like over-
ride and conflict monitoring functions which prevent automatic and impulsive behav-
ior from occurring. Yet, when applied directly to the study of the brain, the computa-
tional basis of decision field theory is better able to accommodate the “noise” associ-
ated with stochastic attentional shifting and this has great potential to explain both the 
causes of reasoning errors, and hence capture decision anomalies that concern behav-
ioral economists, while also providing a realistic depiction of underlying decision pro-
cesses. Individuals’ choices are not formed through linear reasoning procedures, as 
dual-process-based economic models presuppose; real decision-making is messy and 
fragmented, and this is ignored by current dual process models (even by neuroeco-
nomic applications of dual process models. 
Alternative 2: While Bayesian models traditionally offer little insight into the 
psychological basis of decision making, certain “enlightened” Bayesian models of 
cognition have the potential to unite rational analysis of the Bayesian program with 
cutting edge knowledge of cognitive mechanisms which do underwrite decision 
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procedures. In Jones & Love (2011), several candidate models are proposed, each of 
which identifies a different area of cognition and/or perception that is integral to the 
decision process. While it remains to be seen how well these models predict novel 
decision phenomena (many candidate models are being currently tested), there is rea-
son to believe that a Bayesian model of cognition applied to local or specific cognitive 
and perceptual tasks could explain how decision anomalies occur without adverting 
to “bargaining games” or “tradeoffs” between dual systems whose underlying func-
tional characteristics aren’t well-defined. Enlightened Bayesian models of cognition 
seek to ground optimization procedures in the very mechanisms that cognitive science 
recognizes to be complicit in reasoning errors. If it can be shown that certain mecha-
nisms, or clusters of mechanisms, abide by Bayes’s rule and “compute” optimization 
procedures, this potentially avoids many of the conceptual and ontological confusions 
generated by dual-process-based economic models.  
Further, unlike computational models of cognition, which are most descriptive 
and hence most illuminating when applied directly to the brain, Bayesian models of 
cognition claim to apply to multiple-levels of analysis (to use Marr’s distinction). Alt-
hough there are different models on the market, and it will take time to determine 
which are amenable to the purposes of behavioral economics, some Bayesian models 
of perception claim to adequately bridge computational, algorithmic, and implemen-
tation levels in a way that does not conflate their functional characteristics. If true, this 
could provide a remarkable basis for grounding rational analysis that behavioral econ-
omists seek. But, this, like the former alternative, is speculative and requires testing 
in economic conditions before it can be declared viable or not viable… 
 
3. Bibliography 
 
Busemeyer, J.R., & Johnson, J.G. (2004). Computational models of decision making. 
In Koehler, D.J., & Harvey, N. (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and de-
cision making, (pp.133-154). John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Busemeyer, J.R., & Johnson, J.G. (2008). Micro-process models of decision making. 
Cambridge handbook of Computational Psychology, 302, p.321. 
 
Fumagalli, R. (2013). The futile search for true utility. Economics & Philosophy, 
29(3), 325-347. 
 
Fumagalli, R. (2016). Five theses on neuroeconomics. Journal of Economic Method-
ology, 23(1), 77-96. 
 
82 
 
 
Jones, M., & Love, B.C. (2011). Bayesian fundamentalism or enlightenment? On the 
explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cogni-
tion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(4), 169-188. 
 
Vromen, J. (2011). Neuroeconomics: two camps gradually converging: what can eco-
nomics gain from it?. International Review of Economics, 58(3), 267-285. 
  
83 
 
 
Samenvatting 
In dit proefschrift geef ik een filosofisch perspectief op verschillende opvattingen over 
sleutelbegrippen als actorschap, rationaliteit en preferentie, en de relatie die ze hebben 
met keuze. Het filosofische perspectief dat ik inneem is tweeledig: enerzijds kan 
filosofische analyse de dubbelzinnigheden van definities en concepten die in 
interdisciplinair onderzoek kunnen ontstaan verhelderen. Dit is belangrijk gezien het 
feit dat traditionele filosofische concepten als geest, cognitie en intentionaliteit een rol 
spelen in hedendaagse economische studie van keuze. Een van de doelen van dit 
proefschrift is dan ook om hedendaags onderzoek naar actorschap en keuze aan een 
dergelijk filosofisch onderzoek te onderwerpen. Anderzijds kunnen de vragen en 
onderwerpen die in dit proefschrift worden besproken worden opgevat als 
wetenschapsfilosofie: ze gaan over wetenschappelijke praktijken, zowel theoretisch 
als empirisch. Om dit te doen richt het proefschrift zich op economisch en 
gedragsonderzoek. Dit omvat traditionele micro-economische disciplines, zoals 
besluitvorming en speltheorie, maar het heeft ook betrekking op nieuwe 
interdisciplinaire vakgebieden die tussen economie en cognitieve wetenschappen 
inliggen, zoals gedragseconomie, neuro-economie en experimentele psychologie. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een brede karakterisering van de controversiële relatie tussen 
actorschap en keuze door zich te richten op een centraal debat in de filosofie van de 
economie. Behaviorisme, breed opgevat, is de positie dat mensen stimulus-respons 
machines zijn, en dat gedrag kan worden beschreven en verklaard zonder verwijzing 
naar mentale gebeurtenissen of interne psychologische processen. 
Gedragsdeskundigen hebben de neiging om individuele acties te beschouwen als 
geconditioneerde reacties op externe krachten. Mentalisme daarentegen is het 
standpunt dat mensen meer zijn dan stimulus-responsmachines, en dat economen, om 
de beslissingen en het keuzegedrag van individuen te begrijpen, wellicht het reilen en 
zeilen van de geest en/of de hersenen moeten onderzoeken. Hoofdstuk 2 evalueert de 
relevantie van de mentalisme-behaviorisme (MB) tweestrijd in de economie in het 
licht van recente debatten en de daaruit volgende argumenten ten gunste van het 
mentalisme. Ik beargumenteer dat er twee problemen zijn met de huidige opvattingen 
over de MB-onderscheid zoals het van toepassing is op de manier waarop economen 
en beslissingsonderzoekers bewijsmateriaal interpreteren en verzamelen. Ten eerste 
is het onduidelijk waar het MB-onderscheid precies over gaat of betrekking op heeft 
—dat wil zeggen, economen en beslissingsonderzoekers kunnen verschillende 
motivaties hebben om het mentalisme te onderschrijven en/of om zich te verzetten 
tegen behaviorisme. Ten tweede, en nog belangrijker, is het onduidelijk hoe het MB-
onderscheid verondersteld wordt empirisch onderzoek in de economie en het 
beslissingsonderzoek te verbeteren of te bevorderen. Met name aanhangers van het 
mentalisme hebben de moeilijke taak om te verduidelijken wat mentalisme inhoudt. 
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Met betrekking op het eerste probleem beschouw ik twee veelvoorkomende 
motivaties om het mentalisme te steunen: de ene motivatie doet een beroep op de 
keuzetheoretische grondslagen van de economie; de andere doet een beroep op de 
wetenschappelijke praktijk in de economie. Met betrekking op het tweede probleem 
beargumenteer ik dat het MB-onderscheid waarschijnlijk geen vooruitgang of 
verbetering van de wetenschappelijke praktijk in de hedendaagse economische 
context zal opleveren, omdat noch het mentalisme (noch het behaviorisme) in staat is 
om verklarende problemen te analyseren en op te lossen die uniek zijn voor niet-
keuzedata, d.w.z. psychologische en neurowetenschappelijke data. Ik besluit met het 
bespreken van de beperkingen van het functionalisme, de steunpilaar van het 
mentalisme, en stel ten opzichte van het MB-onderscheid alternatieve onderscheiden 
voor, waarvan sommigen al gebruikt worden in de naburige cognitieve en 
gedragswetenschappen.  
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op de vraag of, d.w.z. onder welke omstandigheden, mensen 
zich gedragen als economische actoren. In tegenstelling tot de debatten die in 
hoofdstuk 2 worden besproken, die een overwegend individualistische benadering tot 
economische concepten en beslissingsfenomenen hanteren, laat dit hoofdstuk zien hoe 
externe krachten zoals sociale instituten en informatiestructuren individueel gedrag 
zowel ondersteunen als beperken. Ik beargumenteer dat individualisme problematisch 
is als basis voor het onderzoek naar sociale interactie. Daarbij bestudeer ik de theorie 
van Don Ross (2005, 2006) over 'multiple-selves' als een manier om de beperkte 
rationaliteit van individuen te verzoenen met hun beperkte individualiteit. Ross stelt 
dat individuele personen complexe samenvoegingen van “zelven” zijn, die ontstaan 
als reactie op druk van buitenaf om individueel gedrag te reguleren en het volgen van 
publieke normen en conventies mogelijk te maken. Ik onderzoek dus de verschillende 
rollen die “zelven” spelen in Ross' bredere filosofie van de economie en ik identificeer 
afzonderlijke projecten die zich daarin voordoen. Ik onderscheid drie verschillende 
rollen voor “zelven”, een evolutionaire, narratieve en een economische. Ik stel dat 
deze rollen bijdragen aan twee verschillende, maar overlappende projecten. Ik 
beargumenteer dat, hoewel het niet problematisch is om “zelven” te begrijpen op basis 
van hun verschillende rollen, we er niet van uit moeten gaan dat hun functies of 
eigenschappen in één rol dezelfde doelen kunnen dienen voor verschillende projecten.  
Na het belang van externe krachten voor het begrijpen van de quasi-economische 
actorschap van de mens te hebben uitgewerkt, keert hoofdstuk 4 terug naar het domein 
van de individuele besluitvorming. De vraag die hier wordt gesteld is: hoe integreren 
interdisciplinaire benaderingen van beslissingsonderzoek psychologische inzichten 
met economische methoden? En, wat zijn de conceptuele en ontologische problemen 
voor een dergelijke integratie? Hierin kijk ik kritisch hoe “multiple-self” modellen 
van intrapersoonlijke en intertemporele keuze zijn geïntegreerd met “dual-process” 
en “dual-system” theorieën uit de sociale psychologie en cognitieve wetenschap. 
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Multiple-self modellen van intrapersoonlijke en intertemporele keuzes kwamen naar 
voren in de beslissingstheorie en speltheorie om economen te helpen de dynamiek van 
interne conflicten beter te begrijpen en om anomalieën en inconsistenties die zich 
voordoen te voorspellen en – hopelijk – te verklaren. Dual-proces theorieën over 
redeneren en oordelen zijn een ander middel om interne conflicten vast te leggen. Het 
stelt onderzoekers in staat om "hogere" cognitieve processen te onderscheiden, die 
geassocieerd worden met doordachte oordelen en het vermogen om logisch te 
redeneren, van "lagere", meer primitieve informatieprocessen, die meestal 
geassocieerd wordt met affectieve toestanden en emotionele reacties.  Ik gebruik de 
term 'multi-agent model' om modellen aan te duiden die gebruik maken van meerdere 
actoren met contrasterende psychologische vaardigheden. Dergelijke modellen lijken 
steeds populairder te worden gezien hun vermeende vermogen om redeneerfouten en 
beslissingsanomalieën als gevolg van interne conflicten of gebrek aan zelfcontrole te 
voorspellen en te verklaren. Ik analyseer hoe multi-actorenmodellen "zelven" en 
"systemen" opvatten en gebruiken om intrapersoonlijke en intraneurale conflicten 
voor te stellen. Het hoofdstuk is gestructureerd aan de hand van drie beweringen. De 
eerste en tweede bewering stellen vast dat multi-agentmodellen zowel conceptueel als 
ontologisch ambigu zijn. De derde bewering stelt dat deze ambiguïteiten kunnen 
leiden tot problemen in het wetenschappelijke streven naar begrip van 
keuzefenomenen. Het onderzoek van multi-agentmodellen is niet alleen cruciaal om 
te begrijpen hoe economenen en psychologen zelfcontrole interpreteren en 
modelleren, maar biedt ook een belangrijke kans om de effecten te bestuderen van de 
wederzijdse beïnvloeding van verschillende disciplines. 
Hoofdstuk 5 bouwt voort op de argumenten uit hoofdstuk 4 en gaat in op het 
succesverhaal van de gedragseconomie. Het onderzoekt de rol die de dual process-
theorie (DPT) heeft gespeeld in de gedragseconomie en gaat over de vraag wat de 
beschrijvende beperkingen zijn van psychologisch dualistische modellen. Zowel 
cognitieve wetenschappers als filosofische psychologen hebben kritiek geuit op de 
theoretische fundamenten van de standaardvisie van de DPT en hebben 
beargumenteerd dat het bewijs dat wordt gebruikt om deze theorie te ondersteunen 
niet geldig is. Bovendien hebben recente wijzigingen van de DPT naar aanleiding van 
deze kritiek tot extra zorgen geleid over de toepasbaarheid en onweerlegbaarheid 
ervan. Ik beargumenteer dat dit tot bezorgdheid zou moeten leiden bij 
gedragseconomen die de DPT zien als een psychologisch realistische basis voor hun 
modellen. In het bijzonder verhoogt het de mogelijkheid dat dualistische modellen 
niet zo nauwkeurig of betrouwbaar zijn als gedragseconomen veronderstellen. In feite 
kan men stellen dat de populariteit van de DPT in de gedragseconomie minder te 
maken heeft met het empirische succes van dualistische modellen, en meer met het 
gemak dat het duale verhaal economen biedt die op zoek zijn naar het oplossen van 
beslissingsanomalieën. Ik beargumenteer dat de groeiende kritiek op DPT 
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gedragseconomen met een dilemma achterlaat: of ze houden vast aan hun vermeende 
ambities om een realistische beschrijving van menselijke besluitvorming te geven en 
wijzigen hun gebruik van DPT, of ze houden vast aan DPT en wijzigen hun ambities. 
Hoofdstuk 6 besluit mijn proefschrift. In dit hoofdstuk denk ik na over de vraag 
hoe nu verder? In hoofdstukken 2-5 komen twee hoofdbenaderingen naar voren om 
de spanning tussen actorschap en keuze te verzoenen. De ene benadering beschouwt 
individuele personen als de primaire studieobjecten voor de economie, en als zodanig 
kunnen psychologie en neurowetenschappen helpen bij het bepalen van de juiste 
benadering naar dit studieobject. De tweede benadering beschouwt individuele 
personen niet als het primaire studieobject (economische actoren zijn de primaire 
studie, en ze zijn ontologisch verschillend van personen). Als zodanig moeten keuzes 
worden opgevat als het resultaat van externe (markt)druk. Dus, voor elk van deze 
benaderingen duiken er er nieuwe ontwikkelingen en nieuwe filosofische vragen op. 
 
 
 
 
  
87 
 
 
Summary  
 
In this thesis, I offer a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of key 
notions such as agency, rationality, and preference, and their relation to choice. The 
philosophical perspective I offer is two-fold: on the one hand, philosophical analysis 
can clarify ambiguities of definitions and concepts that can arise in interdisciplinary 
research. This is of particular importance given how traditional philosophical concepts 
such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in contemporary economic studies 
of choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject cutting-edge research on ques-
tions of agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand, the ques-
tions and topics discussed in this thesis can be understood as an exercise in philosophy 
of science: they deal with questions and topics that pertain to the practices, both the-
oretical and empirical, of scientists. To this end, the thesis targets economics and be-
havioral decision research. This includes traditional microeconomic disciplines, such 
as decision and game theory; but it also can be extended to new interdisciplinary syn-
theses between economics and the cognitive sciences, such as behavioral economics, 
neuroeconomics, and experimental psychology. 
Chapter 2 provides a broad characterization of the contentious relationship be-
tween agency and choice by focusing on a pivotal debate in the philosophy of eco-
nomics. Behaviorism, broadly construed, is the position that humans are stimulus-
response machines, and that behavior can be described and explained without making 
reference to mental events or to internal psychological processes. Behaviorists tend to 
regard individual actions as patterned—or conditioned—responses to external forces. 
Mentalism, by contrast, is the position that humans are more than stimulus-response 
machines, and that in order to understand individuals’ decisions and choice-behaviors, 
economists may need to investigate the goings-on of the mind and/or brain. Chapter 
2 thus evaluates the relevance of the mentalism-behaviorism (MB) dichotomy in eco-
nomics in light of recent debates and subsequent arguments in favor of mentalism. I 
argue that there are two problems with current conceptions of the MB dichotomy as 
it pertains to how economists and decision researchers interpret and gather evidence. 
First, it is unclear what the MB dichotomy pertains to or is about exactly—which is 
to say, economists and decision researchers may have different motivations for en-
dorsing mentalism and/or for opposing behaviorism. Second, and more importantly, 
it is unclear how the MB dichotomy is supposed to improve or advance empirical 
research in economics and decision research—in particular, supporters of mentalism 
have the difficult task of clarifying what mentalism entails or consists in. In response 
to the first problem, I consider two common motivations for endorsing mentalism: 
one motivation appeals to the choice-theoretic foundations of economics; the other 
appeals to scientific practice in economics. In response to the second problem, I argue 
that the MB dichotomy likely won’t advance or improve scientific practice in 
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contemporary economic settings because neither mentalism (nor behaviorism) are 
equipped to analyze and resolve explanatory problems that are unique to non-choice 
data, i.e. psychological and neuroscientific data. I conclude by discussing the limita-
tions of functionalism, the mainstay of the mentalism defense book, and suggest al-
ternative schemas to the MB dichotomy, some of which are employed in neighboring 
areas of the cognitive and behavioral sciences.  
Chapter 3 considers whether, i.e. under what conditions, human persons behave 
like economic agents. In contrast to debates discussed in chapter 2, which take a pre-
dominantly individualistic approach to the analysis economic concepts and decision 
phenomena, this chapter demonstrates how external forces such as social institutions 
and informational structures both support and constrain individual behaviors. I argue 
that individualism is problematic as a basis for investigating social interaction. In so 
doing I examine the Don Ross’ (2005, 2006) account of “multiple-selves” as a way of 
reconciling individuals’ bounded rationality with their bounded individuality. Ross 
argues that individual persons are complex aggregations of selves, which arise in re-
sponse to external pressures to regulate individual behaviors and enable the tracking 
of public norms and conventions. I thus investigate the different roles that selves play 
in Ross’ broader philosophy of economics and I identify separate projects that arise 
therein. I distinguish three different roles for selves, which are evolutionary, narrative, 
and economic, and I argue that these roles contribute to two distinct, but overlapping, 
projects. I will argue that, while it is not problematic to conceive of selves according 
to their different roles, we should not presume that the functions or properties of selves 
in one role can serve the same purposes for different projects.  
 Having elaborated the importance of external forces for understanding humans’ 
quasi-economic agency, Chapter 4 returns to the domain of individual decision-mak-
ing—it asks: how do interdisciplinary approaches to decision research integrate psy-
chological insights with economic methods? And, what are the conceptual and onto-
logical challenges of such integration? Herein I critically examine how multiple-self 
models of intrapersonal and intertemporal choice have been integrated with dual-pro-
cess and dual-system theories from social psychology and cognitive science. Multiple-
self models of intrapersonal and intertemporal choice emerged in decision theory and 
game theory to help economists better understand the dynamics of internal conflict 
and to predict—and hopefully explain—choice anomalies and inconsistencies that 
arise over time. Dual-process theories of reasoning and judgment are another means 
of capturing internal conflict. It allows researchers to discern “higher” cognitive pro-
cessing, which are associated with deliberative judgments and the ability to reason 
logically, from “lower”, more primitive information processing, which is usually as-
sociated with affective states and visceral responses.  I adopt the term ‘multi-agent 
model’ to denote models which conceive of multiple agents with contrasting psycho-
logical abilities. Such models seem to be growing in popularity given their purported 
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ability to predict and explain reasoning errors and decision anomalies due to internal 
conflict or lack of self-control. I analyze how multi-agent models conceive of and 
employ “selves” and “systems” for the purposes of representing intrapersonal and in-
traneural conflict. The chapter is structured according to three claims. The first and 
second claims establish that multi-agent models are conceptually as well as ontologi-
cally ambiguous. The third claim argues that such ambiguities can lead to problems 
in scientific understanding. The examination of multi-agent models is not only critical 
to understanding economists and psychologists jointly interpret and model self-con-
trol problems, but it further presents an important opportunity to study the effects of 
cross-disciplinary pollination of concepts and theories. 
Chapter 5 builds on the arguments ventured in Chapter 4 and confronts the suc-
cess story of behavioral economics. It investigates the role that dual process theory 
(DPT) has played in behavioral economics, and it questions what the descriptive lim-
itations of psychologically dualistic models are. Cognitive scientists and philosophical 
psychologists alike have criticized the theoretical foundations of the standard view of 
dual process theory and have argued against the validity and relevance of evidence 
used to support it. Moreover, recent modifications of dual process theory in light of 
these criticisms have generated additional concerns regarding its applicability and ir-
refutability. I argue that this should raise concerns for behavioral economists who see 
dual process theory as providing psychologically realistic foundations for their mod-
els. In particular, it raises the possibility that dualistic models are not as descriptively 
accurate or reliable as behavioral economists presume them to be. In fact, the case can 
be made that the popularity of dual process theory in behavioral economics has less 
to do with the empirical success of dualistic models, and more to do with the conven-
ience that the dualism narrative provides economists looking to sort out decision 
anomalies. I will argue that the growing number of criticisms against DPT leaves be-
havioral economists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported 
ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and modify their 
use of DPT, or they stick to DPT and modify their ambitions. 
In Chapter 6 I offer concluding remarks and consider where one goes from here. 
First, Chapters 2 – 5 project two main approaches to reconciling the tension between 
agency and choice. One approach views individual persons as the primary objects of 
study for economics, and as such, psychology and neuroscience can help locate a more 
appropriate locus for the study of choice. The second approach views individual per-
sons not as the primary object of study, (economic agents are the primary study, and 
they are ontologically distinct from persons). As such, choice should be construed as 
the outcome of external (market) pressures, which include important socio-cognitive 
supports. Hence, for each of these approaches, there are new pursuits and new philo-
sophical questions to be considered. 
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